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CY PRES IN CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENTS
RHONDA WASSERMAN*
Monies reserved to settle class action lawsuits often go unclaimed
because absent class members cannot be identified or notified or because
the paperwork required is too onerous. Rather than allow the unclaimed
funds to revert to the defendant or escheat to the state, courts are
experimenting with cy pres distributions-theyaward the funds to charities
whose work ostensibly serves the interests of the class "as nearly as
possible."

"

Although laudable in theory, cy pres distributions raise a host of
problems in practice. They often stray far from the "next best use,
sometimes benefitting the defendant more than the class. Class counsel
often lacks a personalfinancial interest in maximizing direct payments to
class members because the fee is just as large if the money is paid cy pres
to charity. And if the judge has discretion to select the charitablerecipient
of the unclaimedfunds, she may select her alma mater or anotherfavored
charity, thereby creating an appearanceof impropriety.
To minimize overrelianceon cypres distributionsand to tailor them to
serve the best interests of the class, this Article makes four pragmatic
* Professor of Law and Buchanan, Ingersoll & Rooney Faculty Scholar, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law. I would like to thank Sam Issacharoff, John Leubsdorf, Michael Morley,
Marty Redish and Jay Tidmarsh for their helpful and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this
Article; Bernadette Bollas Genetin for helpful references to relevant materials; and Ian Everhart and
Carter Cristopher Hoel for invaluable research assistance. I am grateful for the many constructive
comments I received when presenting this paper at faculty colloquia at the University of Akron School
of Law and the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Finally, I dedicate this Article with much love
and great pride to my youngest son, Benjamin Wasserman Stem, on the occasion of his graduation from
high school.
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recommendations. First, to align the interests of class counsel and the
class, courts should presumptively reduce attorneys'fees in cases in which
cy pres distributions are made. Second, to ensure that class members,
potential objectors, and courts have the information they need to assess the
fairness of a settlement that contemplates a cy pres distribution, class
counsel should be requiredto make a series of disclosures when it presents
the settlement for judicial approval. Third, to inject an element of
adversarialconflict into the fairness hearing and to ensure that the court
receives the information needed to scrutinize the proposed cy pres
distribution, the court should appoint a devil's advocate to oppose the
settlement in general and the cy pres distributionin particular. Finally, the
court should be required to make written findings in connection with its
review of any class action settlement that contemplates a cy pres
distribution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A group of Facebook users filed a class action lawsuit against the
social media giant because its short-lived Beacon program exposed
personal information about them without their permission.' Lawyers for the
parties eventually negotiated a $9.5 million settlement. 2 Here's the odd
part: not a single penny went to the absent class members.3 Not even the
class members who had prospective claims under federal law for statutory
damages in the amount of $2500 received any money.4 So what happened
to the $9.5 million? The lawyers representing the class received about
$3 million and the rest went to a brand-new organization called the Digital
Trust Foundation. 5 Why wasn't the money paid to the class members, you
may ask? Because distributing it among the class members would have
been economically infeasible given how small their pro rata shares were
relative to the costs of administration. Who ran the Digital Trust
Foundation, you may ask? Facebook's Director of Public Policy was one of
its three directors, and Facebook's attorney, together with class counsel,
made up its board of legal advisors. 6 So by paying a big chunk of money to
class counsel and a bigger chunk of money to an organization over which it
I.
134 S. Ct.
2.
3.
4.

Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane,
8 (2013) (mem.). See infra Part VI.B for a more complete discussion of the case.
Id. at 817.

Id.
See id. at 824 ("Objectors are no doubt correct that the [Video Privacy Protection Act] claims
of some class members might prove valuable if successful at trial."). Consumers may claim $2500 in
liquidated damages for violations of the Act. Id. at 822.
5.
6.

Id. at 817.
Id at 817-18.
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exerted significant control, Facebook was able to secure the release of all
of the claims against it arising out of the challenged Beacon program.
If this sounds fishy to you, you are not alone. While Chief Justice John
Roberts agreed with the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the case, he
issued a separate statement in which he voiced "fundamental concerns
surrounding the use of [cy pres] remedies" 7-that is, payments of
settlement funds to charities in lieu of payments to individual class
members. Roberts suggested that "[iun a suitable case, this Court may need
to clarify the limits on the use of such remedies."8 This Article seeks to
offer analysis and pragmatic recommendations that might inform regulation
of cy pres remedies by the Court and others.
Cy pres remedies are an increasingly common feature in class action
settlements. 9 Although in the Facebook case no effort was made to pay
even a portion of the settlement fund to the absent class members, more
commonly courts use cy pres to distribute monies that remain unclaimed
following efforts to pay class members their respective shares.o Rather
than return the unclaimed monies to the defendant or pay them to the
government, settling parties typically propose, and reviewing courts
typically acquiesce, to pay the unclaimed monies to charities that will serve
the interests of the absent class members "as near as possible." 1
7. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
Linda Greenhouse, former Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times, wrote that Chief
Justice Roberts's statement, "while not an everyday occurrence at the court, isn't all that rare, either."
Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., Bring Me a Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/11/14/opinion/bring-me-a-case.html.
8. Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 9 (Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
9. Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologiesof the
Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 653, 661 (2010)
(finding, on the basis of an empirical analysis of cases decided between 1974 and 2008, that the use of
cy pres awards "accelerated sharply after 2000" and concluding that "the prevalence of class action cy
pres awards has increased steadily by decade since the 1980s and has accelerated noticeably after
2000").
10. Id. at 620.
11. Another controversial remedy, fluid recovery, typically "involves the distribution of funds to
present individuals who occupy more or less the same position as the victims of the defendant's past
wrongdoing; for instance, if the defendant cheated past consumers on their credit card transactions,
relief might be given to the present credit card holders as an approximation." Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres
and the Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 767, 769 n.5 (2014). See also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 cmt. a (2010) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (discussing
the use of cy pres and fluid recovery); Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 620-21, 635, 661-64
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While this solution sounds sensible in theory, in practice a host of
problems arise, 12 as the Facebook settlement suggests. In particular, the
recipient charities often fail to serve the interests of the class or to address
the concerns raised in their lawsuit. Defendants may prefer cy pres
distributions over direct payments to class members, however, because
from a public relations perspective, it looks good when a company makes a
sizeable "donation" to charity; and reviewing courts may enjoy the
opportunity to steer the funds to a favored charity or alma mater. Class
counsel, which should be working its hardest to put the settlement funds
into the hands of class members, may suffer a conflict of interest. Class
counsel's fee is typically determined as a fraction of the settlement fund
regardless of the portion that is actually claimed by absent class members,
so class counsel may not work its hardest to put money into the hands of
the absentees.' 3
These problems arise in large part because the absent class members
lack the incentive and means to monitor class counsel. 14 In the absence of
monitoring, class counsel may negotiate a settlement that fails to serve the
best interests of the class and may fall down on the job of getting
settlement funds into the hands of the absentees. The court, which is
required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to review any proposed
class action settlement,' 5 may lack the information needed to assess the
settlement's fairness and the appropriateness of any cy pres distribution
contemplated by the settlement. 16 Thus, this Article proposes a set of
pragmatic recommendations designed to diminish the conflict of interest
between the class and its counsel and to provide the court with the
information it needs to scrutinize class action settlements and proposed cy
pres distributions.' 7
Part II sets the stage by describing the varied circumstances in which
class action settlement funds remain unclaimed or non-distributable. Part
III identifies the alternate means by which courts could distribute such
funds-reversion to the defendant, escheat to the state, or supplemental
distributions to claimants-and the reasons why courts often reject these
(same).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Part V.
See infra notes 109-115, 192-195 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 240-242 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
See infra notes 270-275 and accompanying text.
See infra Part VII.
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alternatives. To introduce the cy pres remedy, Part IV provides a brief
history of its use in the context of charitable trusts and its adaptation in the
class action context. With this background on cy pres in place, Part V
identifies the problems that may arise when cy pres is used in the class
action context. Specifically, Part V addresses the risk that the defendant
and class counsel will put their own interests ahead of the interests of the
class in structuring the settlement and choosing the cy pres recipients, and
the reasons why courts sometimes acquiescence. Part VI illustrates these
problems with analyses of two recent class action settlements.
Part VII, the centerpiece of this Article, offers four pragmatic
recommendations to limit reliance on cy pres remedies and to better tailor
them to serve the interests of the class. The first proposal, to presumptively
limit attorneys' fees in cases in which some or all of the settlement fund is
distributed cy pres to charity, is designed to address the potential conflict of
interest between the class and its counsel. The second and third proposals,
regarding disclosure statements and devil's advocates, are designed to
remedy informational deficiencies and to improve monitoring of class
counsel. The final proposal, which would require trial courts to make
certain findings when reviewing class action settlements with cy pres
features, is designed to ensure rigorous judicial review by both trial and
appellate courts and to minimize reliance on cy pres distributions.
II. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM OF UNCLAIMED OR
NONDISTRIBUTABLE FUNDS
A large percentage of certified class actions settle.' 8 Once the district
court approves the settlement, 19 the claims administrator distributes the
settlement monies to the class members upon submission of claim forms.
Sometimes, however, class members cannot be identified or it costs too
much to process their claims relative to their size. 20 Even when claiming
18. While Federal Judicial Center researchers had previously concluded that "almost all certified
class actions settle," Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice ofForum in Class
Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 647 (2006), their
most recent "study shows . . . a lower percentage (58%) of original proceedings with certified classes
leading to a class settlement." Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, Class Certificationand Class

Settlement: Findingsfrom FederalQuestion Cases, 2003-2007, 80 U. CIN. L. REv. 315, 341-42 (2011).
19.

Class actions filed in federal court "may be settled . .. only with the court's approval." FED.

R. CIV. P. 23(e).

20. E.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that a settlement fund
is "non-distributable" when "the proof of individual claims would be burdensome or distribution of
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class members are paid, a portion of the settlement fund often remains
unclaimed and the court must decide what to do with the unclaimed funds.
Before we consider possible solutions to this problem, it may be helpful to
consider why settlement funds are non-distributable or go unclaimed.
First, in some class actions, a significant number of absent class
members' identities are not known and it is impossible to provide them
with individual notice of the opportunity to file a claim. 21 Consider, for
example, the class actions filed on behalf of purchasers of Milli Vanilli
recordings, 22 purchasers of Cuisinart food processors, 2 3 and taxicab
customers in Los Angeles, 24 just to list a few of my favorites. While the
court must "direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under
the circumstances" 25 and may in some cases resort to notice by publication,
broadcast, or Internet, 26 there is a genuine risk in such cases that the
absentees will not learn of the settlement and therefore will not file
claims.27
damages costly" (quoting Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011))), cert. denied
sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (mem.). The objecting class members in Lane "concede[d]
that direct monetary payments to the class of remaining settlement funds would be infeasible given that
each class member's direct recovery would be de minimis." Id. at 821.

21.

E.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting the

impossibility of individual notice because the defendant lacked a record of the customers whose
financial information it had given to telemarketers). See also 3 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10:14 (4th ed. 2002) (describing circumstances in which funds remain
unclaimed); Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 769-70 & n.7 (noting that in some instances it may be too
difficult "to identify the victims of conduct that occurred years earlier").

22.

See Freedman v. Arista Records, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 225, 228-29 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (declining on

other grounds to certify a class of seven million purchasers of Milli Vanilli recordings who claimed
they had been defrauded upon learning that the group's "singers" had not actually sung in the

recordings).
23. In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litig., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12412, at *8-10,
*20-21, *29 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 1983) (approving the settlement of a class action filed on behalf of
more than 1.5 million Cuisinart purchasers and noting that fewer than one million received individual
notice of the class action and proposed settlement).

24.

Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1967) ("The fact that the class members are

unidentifiable at this point will not preclude a complete determination of the issues affecting the
class.").

25.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).

26.

3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 8:29-8:30 (5th ed. 2013).
See, e.g., Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1990)

27.

(anticipating that "a substantial number of class members would never be located for distribution of the
damage award").
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Second, even where the class members' identities are known, their
claims may be so small that it is not economically feasible to calculate
individual damages or to cut individual checks and mail them to the
absentees. 28 For example, in a class action that challenged AOL's practice
of appending footers with advertisements to emails, the court concluded
that the maximum the class could have recovered at trial would have been
$2 million (that is, the amount AOL received for selling the ads); but with
sixty-six million AOL subscribers in the class, "each member of the class
would receive only about 3 cents. The cost to distribute these payments
would far exceed the maximum potential recovery." 29
Third, even where direct payments are economically feasible, absent
class members may decline to submit claim forms. 30 In cases involving
elderly or ill class members, there is a heightened risk that they will die
before claiming their respective shares. For example, in a class action
against a drug manufacturer that allegedly inflated the price of a cancer
drug, the parties anticipated that some class members would "not file
claims because they [were] elderly or [had] died and their heirs [would] not
stand in their shoes." 3 1 In other cases, the cumbersomeness of the claims
28. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[Djirect monetary
payments to the class ... would be infeasible given that each class member's direct recovery would be
de minimis."), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (mem.); Klier v. Elf Atochem
N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475 n.15 (5th Cir. 2011) ("[T]here comes a point at which the marginal cost
of making an additional pro rata distribution to the class members exceeds the amount available for
distribution."); In re Am. Tower Corp. Sec. Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 223, 224 n.l (D. Mass. 2009)
("[R]esidual funds will be donated to nonprofits only where the cost per class member of distributing
the residual funds substantially outweighs the amount each class member would receive."). See also
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, § 3.07 cmt. b (sanctioning cy pres awards where "distribution would
involve such small amounts that, because of the administrative costs involved, such distribution would
not be economically viable"); 3 CONTE &NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 10:14, at 511 ("[T]here may be
instances when the class is so numerous and the individual claims so small that no recovery or
distributions for past losses are possible as a practical matter ... ); Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 769-70
("It may be too difficult (due to information and cost constraints) to identify the victims of conduct that
occurred years earlier or to assess their damages accurately.").
29. Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011). Cf Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg.
Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the parties' contention that "each member would
receive an amount smaller than the cost of postage").
30. 3 CONTE &NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 10:14.
31. Howe v. Townsend (In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig.), 588 F.3d 24, 34
(1st Cir. 2009). See also id at 29 (explaining that a large portion of the sum would go unclaimed
because "many class members were elderly, had died, or could die soon").
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process may discourage class members from claiming their portion of the
settlement. For example, in an antitrust class action that accused defendants
of conspiring to set a price floor for certain baby products, the only way a
class member could recover more than five dollars in damages was by
submitting valid proof of purchase. Questioning the fairness of "a
settlement with such a restrictive claims process," the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit hypothesized that "many class members did
not submit claims because they lacked the documentary proof necessary to
receive the higher awards contemplated, and the $5 award they could
receive left them apathetic." 32
Fourth, even where class members submit claims and the claims
administrator mails them checks, some (or many) of the checks are
returned as undeliverable or are never cashed.3 3 Finally, in some cases,
interest on the settlement fund accrues during the claims administration
process, yielding additional funds that may remain unclaimed. 34
In all of these situations in which unclaimed funds remain, the court
(typically guided by the parties) must decide how to distribute the funds.
We will consider a number of alternatives to cy pres distributions before
we explore the cy pres remedy itself.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO CY PRES DISTRIBUTIONS
A number of potential solutions to the "unclaimed funds" problem
exist. As we will see, however, each of these potential solutions has
32. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2013). See also Goodrich v.
E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., No. 360, 1996 Del. LEXIS 73, at *4 (Del. Feb. 2, 1996) (anticipating that a
large portion of the settlement fund would not be distributed to class members because their claims

were "quite small" and their transaction costs in filing claims would be "relatively high"), aff'd, 681
A.2d 1039 (Del. 1996). In re Baby Products is discussed further in Part VI.A.
33. See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 2011) ("The settlement
administrator sent checks to the last known addresses of plaintiffs, but many were returned as

undeliverable or were never cashed."); Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706-07 (8th Cir.
1997) ("[O]ver 125 checks were returned as undeliverable."). See also 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra
note 21, § 10:14 ("Even when individual notices to last known addresses of class members are sent,
significant numbers of such notices are usually returned as undeliverable.").

&

34. See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that
$60 million in interest had accrued); Powell, 119 F.3d at 705 (reviewing distribution of unclaimed
funds, which included hundreds of thousands of dollars in accrued interest); SEC v. Bear, Steams
Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[M]ore than $79 million . .. cannot be distributed and
continues to accrue interest.").
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problems of its own, so negotiating parties and courts often find themselves
resorting to cy pres distributions.
A. REVERSION TO THE DEFENDANT
One option is to return the unclaimed funds to the defendant." The
rationale is that the defendant owns the money it places into the settlement
fund to compensate class members, and unless or until the money is
claimed by members of the class, the defendant has a substantial, if not
compelling, claim to its retum. 36 The excess remaining in the settlement
fund exists, the argument goes, only because of a mutual mistake regarding
the amount needed to satisfy the class members' claims.3 7 Returning the
excess to the defendant avoids "charging [it] an amount greater than the
35. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 172 (viewing "reversion to the defendant" as one of
the "three principal options for distributing the remaining funds"); Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc.,
658 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that the defendant "itself would appear to have a greater
claim to the funds than a charity . . .absent a contrary directive from the property-interest-defining
settlement agreement"); id. at 481-82 (Jones, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that "if the defendant had
not waived its right to request a refund, it would have been entitled to the excess" and that "[i]n the
ordinary case, . . . the superior approach is to return leftover settlement funds to the defendant"); Wilson
v. Sw. Airlines, Inc., 880 F.2d 807, 813, 816 (5th Cir. 1989) (characterizing the defendant's claim to the
unclaimed funds as a "substantial equitable claim[]" and concluding that a settlement that awarded 64.5
percent of the surplus to the defendant was "fair, reasonable, and adequate"); Van Gemert v. Boeing
Co. (Van Gemnert V) 739 F.2d 730, 731 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming a district court order distributing the
unclaimed fund to the defendant, subject to the condition that the defendant "stand ready to pay valid
claims against the fund in perpetuity"); 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 21, §§ 10:15, 10:17
(explaining that one option for distribution of unclaimed balances is to have the "surplus funds revert to
the defendant"); Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 638-39, 665 (describing arguments in favor
of retention of unclaimed funds by the defendant); Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 768 (noting that while
one option is to return unclaimed funds to the defendant, that option "suffers from a significant
downside: it is a windfall to the alleged wrongdoer").
36. Wilson, 880 F.2d at 813 ("Since [the defendant] turned over its money in the clear and
reasonable expectation that the money was required for the specific purpose of compensating the class,
its equitable claim to any money remaining after the accomplishment of that purpose is compelling.").
See also McKinnie v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 678 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (E.D. Wis. 2009) ("[T]he
reversion of unclaimed funds to the defendant is not objectionable when class members receive full
recovery for their damages and the parties agree to the reversion." (citing Mangone v. First USA Bank,
206 F.R.D. 222, 230 (S.D. Ill. 2001))); Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 639 ("[R]eversion to
the defendant has at least an arguable foundation when the victim, authorized to recover by governing
substantive law, has for whatever reason failed to claim his award.").
37. Klier, 658 F.3d at 482 (Jones, CJ., concurring).
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harm it bargained to settle." 38
Reversion of excess funds to the defendant may also be supported by
the preexistence principle advocated by the late Professor Richard
Nagareda. According to Nagareda, class actions cannot "alter unilaterally
class members' preexisting bundle of rights."39 In his view, class action
settlements are vehicles for the purchase and sale of these preexisting
rights. 4 0 Once the defendant has "purchased" all the claims "sold" by
participating class members, there would appear to be no basis under
preexisting law for depriving the defendant of additional funds.
Some courts have rejected the reversion option, however, because it
"risks undermining the deterrent effect of class actions by rewarding
defendants for the failure of class members to collect their share of the
settlement." 4 1 Courts have considered the policies underlying the
substantive laws invoked by the class. Where the statutory objectives
include deterrence or disgorgement, "it would contradict these goals to
permit the defendant to retain unclaimed funds." 42 As Professor Jay
Tidmarsh put it, reversion to the defendant provides "a windfall to the
alleged wrongdoer." 43
38.

Id.

39.

Richard A. Nagareda, The PreexistencePrincipleand the Structure of the Class Action, 103

COLUM. L. REV. 149, 181 (2003).
40. Id. at 216.
41. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013). See also Hodgson v.
Quezada, 498 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1974) (rejecting reversion to the defendant of the unclaimed portion of
a settlement fund in an enforcement action by the Secretary of Labor under the Fair Labor Standards
Act because the statute was designed to "depriv[e] a violator of any gains resulting from his violation");
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note I1, § 3.07 cmt. b (noting that reversion to the defendant "would undermine
the deterrence function of class actions").

42. Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing
Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 676 (7th Cir. 1981)). See also, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 384(b) (West
2004) (requiring a court that enters a class action judgment to amend it if monies cannot be distributed
to class members and to direct the defendant to pay the "unpaid residue" to cy pres recipients; barring

reversion to the defendant); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004)
(questioning "the reversion of unclaimed refunds to the putative wrongdoer"); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 11, § 3.07 cmt. b (noting that reversion to the defendant "would undermine ...

the underlying

substantive-law basis of the recovery by rewarding the alleged wrongdoer simply because distribution
to the class would not be viable"); Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distributionsin Class Action Settlements,
2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1014, 1044 ("[R]etuming the money to the defendant is often contrary to
the purpose of the statute in the underlying litigation.").
43.

Tidmarsh, supra note I1, at 768. See also Stewart R. Shepherd, Comment, Damage
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B. ESCHEAT TO THE GOVERNMENT

A second option is for the non-distributable or unclaimed funds to
escheat to the government. 44 Section 2042 of Title 28 of the United States
Code authorizes reversion to the United States government of funds
deposited with a federal court that remain unclaimed after five years. 45 The
statute applies when a court so orders or when a court fails to otherwise
dispose of funds. 46 Section 2042 permits claimants entitled to any portion
of the funds to petition for a court order directing payment to them upon
proof of their entitlement. 47 Because the federal statute permits recovery by
absent class members even after reversion of the funds to the government,
this option has been found to "fully protect[]" the interests of absent class
members. 48 In fact, the escheat under § 2042 has been called
"impermanent" 49 and some have questioned whether it is an escheat at all
Distributionin Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448, 456 (1972) (noting that a
cy pres distribution is "preferable to the unjust enrichment of the defendant").

44.

E.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) ("If a suitable cy pres

beneficiary cannot be located, the district court should consider escheating the funds to the United

States Treasury."); Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1307-08 (identifying "escheat to the government"
as one of the court's alternatives in dealing with unclaimed funds); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.,

744 F.2d 1252, 1255 (7th Cir. 1984) (directing that the "remainder of the reserve fund escheat to the
United States"); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. (Van Gemert V), 739 F.2d 730, 733-36 (2d Cir. 1984)
(analyzing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041 and 2042, and holding that they authorize but "do not require as a matter
&

of law that the unclaimed judgment fund be deposited in the Treasury"). See also 3 CONTE

NEWBERG, supranote 21, §§ 10:15-17; Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 619, 639, 665.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2042 (2012). Section 2041 directs that "[a]ll moneys paid into any court of the
United States, or received by the officers thereof, in any case pending or adjudicated in such court, shall
be forthwith deposited with the Treasurer of the United States or a designated depositary, in the name

and to the credit of such court." Id. § 2041. Section 2041 "does not limit the discretion of the district
court to control the unclaimed portion of a class action judgment fund." Van Gemert V, 739 F.2d at 735.

Accord Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 69 F. 462,464 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1895).
46. See, e.g., Van Gemert V, 739 F.2d at 735.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2042.
48. Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308. See also In re Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1255
(noting that entitled claimants may recover from the government "after the escheat"); SEC v. Golconda
Min. Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (directing the Trustee "to deposit the remaining
balance in the Registry of this Court, to be held pursuant to 28 U.S.C., sections 2041 and 2042, for the
benefit of those persons who are entitled to payment under the final judgment, or for the benefit of their
successors in interest").

49. In re Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1255. See also, e.g., Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446
F.2d 527, 535 (3d Cir. 1971) (stating, in the context of an enforcement action filed by the Secretary of
Labor to enforce the Equal Pay Act, that "[t]here is never a permanent escheat to the United States"
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because the United States does not gain title to the money, but just holds it
"as trustee for the rightful owners." 5 0
Money held by the United States under § 2042, money held by a
settlement administrator, or unclaimed funds subject to state court control
may escheat to the state. 1 Unlike reversion to the federal government
under § 2042, escheat is a procedure by which the state actually acquires
title to the abandoned property. 52 In the context of class actions, a state may
escheat the unclaimed funds as a representative of its citizens who did not
collect their share of the fund.5 If the nonclaiming class members are
citizens of different states, each state may escheat the fraction of the fund
corresponding to the fraction of nonclaiming class members whose last
known addresses were within the state. 54 The theory is that "nonclaiming
(citing In re Moneys Deposited In and Now Under the Control of the U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist.
of Pa., 243 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1957))).
50.

In re Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1257 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(stating that § 2042 is "not a federal escheat statute"; the law "does not operate to change the ownership
of the funds; . . . the United States obtains no beneficial interest in the funds"; and "[t]hus, there can be
no permanent escheat to the United States"). See also In re Moneys Deposited, 243 F.2d at 445 (stating
that the United States "holds the money as statutory trustee for the rightful owners").

51.

See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276, 282-83 (1938) (affirming a state court decree

that escheated to the state unclaimed funds that had been transferred to the United States Treasury

pursuant to the statutory predecessor to § 2042); All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 332,
335, 337 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that funds in the possession of a settlement administrator were within
the scope of the Texas unclaimed property statute; concluding that "Rule 23(e) does not preclude
application of the Act to unclaimed funds allocated to identified class members"; and concluding that a
failure to apply the state unclaimed property law in federal court "would lead to the inequitable
administration of justice"); In re Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1258 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[M]oney deposited under section 2042 may escheat to the states ...
where . .

even

the unclaimed property is created under federal law"); Van Gemert V, 739 F.2d at 735 (noting

that if §§ 2041-42 were applied in equity, New York and Illinois eventually "could assert claims under
state abandoned property laws"); Hodgson, 446 F.2d at 535 ("A State may succeed via escheat to the

money" on deposit with the Treasury pursuant to § 2041 and § 2042. (citing Klein)).
52. See, e.g., Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 675 (1965) (describing escheat as "a procedure
with ancient origins whereby a sovereign may acquire title to abandoned property if after a number of
years no rightful owner appears").
53.

In re Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1258 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

("Unlike the federal government, a state government may escheat unclaimed property on behalf of its
citizens because the state stands as parens patriae as to its citizens." (citing Shepherd, supra note 43, at

453-58)).
54. Id. at 1259 (citing Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. at 680-83). Since the Constitution prevents
more than one state from escheating a given piece of property, W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368
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class members will benefit indirectly to the extent that the state uses the
fund to benefit all of its citizens."5 5 Thus, the compensatory objectives of
the law underlying the class claims are served, albeit quite indirectly and
imperfectly since the nonclaiming class members are typically but a small
subset of the state's overall population. 5 6
While imperfectly serving a compensatory objective, an escheat may
better serve the deterrent or disgorgement policies of the substantive law
underlying the class claim by ensuring that the defendant pays the full
amount of the settlement and receives no reversion of unclaimed funds.5 7
Whether or not an escheat serves the policies underlying the
substantive law at issue in the class action, some might justify it on the
theory that the class members benefitted from having their dispute resolved
by the court. As one circuit judge explained, "repayment to the government
to defray some of the costs of the court system would be in the nature of a
U.S. 71, 75-76 (1961), the Supreme Court fashioned the rule that "each item of [intangible]
property ...

is subject to escheat only by the State of the last known address of the creditor, as shown

by the debtor's books and records," Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. at 681-82. See also All Plaintiffs,
645 F.3d at 337 (concluding that unclaimed funds allocated to class members with a last known address
in Texas were governed by the Texas unclaimed property law).
55.

In re Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1258 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

56.

See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that

escheat to the state "benefits the community at large rather than those harmed by the defendant's

conduct"); In re Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1258 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(commenting on the "imperfect fit" but noting that escheat serves antitrust law's compensatory rationale
"by allowing each member of the class some degree of recovery, even if indirect"); ALI PRINCIPLES,

supra note I1, § 3.07 cmt. b ("[E]scheat to the state . .. would benefit all citizens equally, even those
who were not harmed by the defendant's alleged conduct."); Shepherd, supra note 43, at 455-56.
57. In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 172 ("Escheat . . preserves the deterrent effect of class
actions...."); Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1990)
(noting that escheat may serve the deterrence and enforcement policies underlying the substantive law);

In re Folding Carton, 744 F.2d at 1258 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
"to the extent that antitrust law serves a deterrence purpose, it is served through any plan not resulting

in the return of the fund to the defendants"); SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[E]scheat to the government serves the 'deterrence and enforcement goals' of federal
statutes." (quoting Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308)). See also Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra
note 9, at 619 (noting that the deterrent effect would be "completely defeated" or "seriously diluted" if
the remainder of the unclaimed fund were to revert to the defendant); Tidmarsh, supra note I1, at 76869 (reasoning that returning the unclaimed funds to the defendant "is a windfall to the alleged
wrongdoer").
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user fee."5 8 But one may question the fairness of imposing this "fee" on
settling class members when no other litigants have to pay to have their
claims adjudicated in court.
C.

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS TO CLAIMANTS

A third option is to distribute the unclaimed funds, pro rata, among
class members who already have stepped forward to claim their due.5 9 This
option has been espoused by the American Law Institute in its Principles of
the Law of Aggregate Litigation ("the ALI Principles" or, "the Principles"),
which recommend that courts resort to cy pres distributions only after
seeking to "provide for further distributions to participating class
members." 60 The ALI Principles favor further payments to claiming class
members on the theory that
few settlements award 100 percent of a class member's losses, and thus
it is unlikely in most cases that further distributions to class members
would result in more than 100 percent recovery for those class members.
In any event, this Section takes the view that in most circumstances
distributions to class members better approximate the goals of the
substantive laws than distributions to third parties that were not directly
61
injured by the defendant's conduct.
Numerous courts have favored this approach over cy pres
distributions. For example, in a class action against a company whose plant
allegedly emitted toxic chemicals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that unused funds that had been allocated to perform medical
monitoring on members of subclass B should have been distributed to
members of subclass A, who "were the most grievously injured and had not
been fully compensated," 62 rather than to charity by way of a cy pres
58. In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 363 (3d Cir. 2010) (Weis, J., concurring and
dissenting).
59. Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 619. See also Shepherd, supra note 43, at 453
(noting that one option is to "divide the uncollected damages among those class members who do

collect their shares"); Tidmarsh, supra note I1, at 768 (noting that one way of dealing with unclaimed
excess is to "increase payments to those who file claims").
60. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, § 3.07(b). I served on the Members' Consultative Group of
the American Law Institute project, the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, discussed here
and infra Part VII.D.
61.

ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 11,

§ 3.07

cmt. b. Accord In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 173

(cautioning that "direct distributions to the class are preferred over cy pres distributions").

62.

Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 2011); id. at 475-79 (finding

support for a further distribution to members of subclass A in the language of the settlement

112

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:97

distribution.
In a variation on this approach, anticipating that a large portion of the
settlement fund would go unclaimed because the class included many
elderly and ailing people, the parties to one class action settlement agreed
that class members who filed claims should receive double their actual
losses.6 3 In assessing the adequacy of the settlement, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts agreed with one objector that even more
money should go to the claiming class members (rather than to a charity cy
pres). At the trial court's urging, the parties modified the settlement
agreement to provide claiming class members with treble damages if funds
remained after all claiming class members had been paid double
damages. 64 In yet another variation, an appellate court suggested that upon
remand, the parties should consider modifying the settlement agreement to
lighten the eligibility or documentary proof requirements for making a
claim, thereby enlarging the group of absent class members who could
submit viable claims for payment and receive more than a nominal
payment. 65 By putting more money in the hands of (some) class members,
all of these variations further both the compensatory and deterrent
objectives of the laws underlying the class claims. 66
agreement). See also, e.g., In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 174 (noting that a court "could condition
approval of a settlement on the inclusion of a mechanism for additional payouts to individual class
members if the number of claimants turns out to be insufficient to deplete a significant portion of the
total settlement fund").

63.

Howe v. Townsend (In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig.), 588 F.3d 24, 30

(1st Cir. 2009).
64.

Id. at 31-32. In another variation on this approach, a trial court supervising the distribution of

disgorged funds in an SEC enforcement action approved of "additional outreach to locate eligible
recipients who had not submitted a claim." SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409-10
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing the fund administrator's renewed and innovative outreach efforts to reach
investors who had not submitted claim forms, and noting that the 47 percent response rate in "phase II"
was "remarkable" because it represented submissions from people who had not responded in phase I
and actually exceeded the response rate achieved in phase I). Cf Rohn v. Tap Pharm. Prods. (In re

Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.), 677 F.3d 21, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2012) ("The district court
appropriately decided that a supplemental consumer claims process would be prohibitively expensive,
time-consuming, and, given the high mortality rate among members of the class, would likely recruit
few new claimants.").

65.
66.

In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 172 n.6, 176.
Cf Shepherd, supra note 43, at 453 (noting that this method "would neither diminish the

deterrent effect of the judgment nor unjustly enrich the defendant," but adding that "silent class
members will not receive any compensation, even indirectly").
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Not all courts have favored additional distributions to claiming class
members, however. Some courts and scholars have expressed concern that
such a distribution would result in a windfall to the claiming class
members6 7 or create a potential conflict of interest between the class and its
named representatives, who would have an interest "in keeping the other
class members uninformed." 68 Some courts have declined to approve
additional payments to claiming class members to offset their litigation
costs and inflation, concluding that non-claiming absentees have a superior

equitable claim compared to the claim of class members who already have
come forward.6 9 Courts also have expressed concern about the cost and
difficulty of locating individual class members for an additional
distribution, especially if a significant amount of time has passed since the
67. See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg., 677 F.3d at 35 ("[P]rotesting class members are not entitled to
windfalls in preference to cy pres distributions"); Klier, 658 F.3d at 475 (favoring "additional pro rata
distributions to class members . .. except where an additional distribution would provide a windfall to
class members with liquidated-damage claims that were 100 percent satisfied by the initial distribution"
(footnote omitted)); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. (Van Gemert 11), 553 F.2d 812, 816 (2d Cir. 1977)
(bemoaning a possible windfall); In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1053 (S.D.
Cal. 2013) (declining to award claimants the unclaimed funds and expressing concern for "an
impermissible windfall"); McKinnie v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 678 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (E.D. Wis.
2009) (concluding that "a pro rata distribution . . would result in a windfall"). See also Redish, Julian
& Zyontz, supra note 9, at 620, 639 (expressing concern for an "unjustified" or "undeserved" windfall
to the claiming class members); Shepherd, supra note 43, at 453 ("The claims of the silent class
members would be expropriated and a windfall might result for those who appeared and collected their
share of the damages."); Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 768 (expressing concern for "overcompensation

for some victims").
68.

Van Gemert II, 553 F.2d at 816 (quoting Shepherd, supra note 43, at 453). See also, e.g., In

re Lupron Mktg., 677 F.3d at 35 (noting that such windfalls may "create a perverse incentive among
victims to bring suits where large numbers of absent class members were unlikely to make claims"

(quoting Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 632)).
69. See, e.g., In re Lupron Mlktg., 677 F.3d at 34 (rejecting the claim of class members-who had
already received 167 percent of their damages-that they were entitled to residual settlement funds, and
favoring a cy pres distribution that would "benefit the potentially large number of absent class

members"); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1984) (Flaum, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A]warding the fund to . . the claiming class
members . .

ensures that non-claiming members will receive no benefit."); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co.

(Van Gemert V), 739 F.2d 730, 736 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting pro rata distribution of unclaimed funds);
Van Gemert II, 553 F.2d at 815-16 (noting that a distribution of unclaimed funds to claiming class
members means that the non-claiming absentees "will not receive any compensation, even directly"

(quoting Sheperd, supra note 43, at 453)).
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initial distribution and class members may have relocated. 70 The
administrative inconvenience of a pro rata distribution among the claiming
class members is exacerbated where the defendant had been responsible for
the initial distribution but would play no role in a follow-up distribution of
unclaimed funds. 7 1
Since each of these options-reversion to the defendant, escheat to the
government, and further distribution to claiming class members-has
drawbacks (at least in the eyes of some), settling parties and courts have
employed another option to dispose of non-distributable or unclaimed
funds: cy pres distributions. 72 We turn now to a brief history of the cy pres
doctrine, before considering the problems that arise when cy pres
distributions are made in the context of class action settlements.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CY PRES DOCTRINE
The phrase "cy pres" derives from the Norman French expression, cy
pris comme possible, which means "as near as possible." 73 In the charitable
trust context in which the equitable cy pres doctrine originated, courts
employ it when a settlor's or testator's precise intent in creating a
charitable trust cannot be effectuated. In such cases, courts attempt to save
the trust by devising an alternate plan that serves the donor's intent as
nearly as possible. 74 For example, the March of Dimes Foundation, which
70. Holtzman v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that a cy pres distribution "is
most useful when individual stakes are small, and the administrative costs of a second round of
distributions to class members might exceed the amount tha[t] ends up in class members' pockets");

Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that the district court's
"primary concern was the fact that locating the individual class members for an additional distribution
would be very difficult and costly").
71. Powell, 119 F.3d at 707.
72. Professor Martin Redish advocates yet another alternative: denial of class certification.
Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supranote 9, at 639-40.
73. E.g., Howe v. Townsend (In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig.), 588 F.3d 24,
33 (1st Cir. 2009); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 470 (10th ed. 2014); EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PRES
DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1950). For more thorough discussions of cy pres's origins in the

law of trusts, see, for example, Alberto B. Lopez, A Revaluation of Cy Pres Redux, 78 U. CIN. L. REV.
1307, 1313-29 (2010); Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 624-33; John H. Beisner, Jessica
Davidson Miller & Jordan M. Schwartz, Cy Pres: A Not So Charitable Contribution to Class Action
Practice,U.S. CHAMBER COM. 3-6 (Oct. 2010), http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/cypresO.pdf.
74.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003) ("Unless the terms of the trust provide
otherwise, where property is placed in trust to be applied to a designated charitable purpose and it is or
becomes unlawful, impossible, or impracticable to carry out that purpose, or to the extent it is or

CYPRES IN CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS

2014]

115

was initially established to treat polio victims and to conduct research into
polio prevention,75 was permitted to alter its mission to combat other
childhood diseases once the polio vaccine was developed and the donors'
precise intent could no longer be effectuated. 76
In the Middle Ages, the English chancery court invoked the cy pres
doctrine for the benefit of the donor. The theory was that the donor may
have donated money to charity in the hope of securing an "advantageous
position in the kingdom of heaven." 77
If the exact scheme for securing pardon and an eternal period of bliss for
the soul failed for any reason it was natural that chancery with its
ecclesiastical tinge, should think that the testator would have desired the
substitution of any other plan which would bring about the same result as
the original gift.78

Thus, the Chancellor's early use of cy pres in the charitable trust
context at least indirectly benefitted the donor.79 With some initial
hesitation,80 American courts, too, began to employ the doctrine of cy pres
in the charitable trust context; now virtually all states have codified the
'

practice.

Although the cy pres doctrine was initially used only in connection
becomes wasteful to apply all of the property to the designated purpose, the charitable trust will not fail
but the court will direct application of the property or appropriate portion thereof to a charitable purpose
that reasonably approximates the designated purpose."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 399

(1935) ("If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is or
becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor
manifested a more general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail

but the court will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the
general charitable intention of the settlor."); FISCH, supra note 73, at 1.
75.

Whatever Happened to Polio? March of Dimes, NATIONAL

MUSEUM

AM.

HIST.,

http://amhistory.si.edu/polio/howpolio/march.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
76. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004) (mentioning the March of
Dimes example). Cf Sister Elizabeth Kenny Found. v. Nat'l Found., 126 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn.
1964) (discussing a motion by a charitable trust beneficiary, which received trust funds to treat polio
victims, to use the funds to treat other muscular or skeletal diseases).
77.

FISCH, supra note 73, at 4.

78.

Id. at 5 (quoting GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431 (1935)).

79.

Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 626 (discussing the use of cy pres to improve the

settlor's "chance at salvation").
80.

FISCH, supranote 73, at 9-28; Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, supra note 73, at 4-5.

81.

Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 628 & n.59.
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with trusts and estates, 82 in recent years, American courts have adapted it to
the class action context. Drawing upon a student comment published in the
University of Chicago Law Review in 197283 and two student notes that
followed in 1987,84 courts have invoked the cy pres doctrine to distribute
unclaimed or non-distributable funds to serve the policy objectives
underlying the class action and the interests of the absent class members
"as nearly as possible."85
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
argued that the analogy to cy pres in the trust context is strained:
In the class action context the reason for appealing to cy pres is to
prevent the defendant from walking away from the litigation scot-free
because of the infeasibility of distributing the proceeds of the
settlement . . to the class members. There is no indirect benefit to the
class from the defendant's giving the money to someone else. In such a
case the "cy pres" remedy (badly misnamed . . .) is purely punitive. 86

Professor Martin Redish, too, views the analogy as faulty8 7 and
82. Id. at 630.
83. Shepherd, supra note 43, at 452 ("When distribution problems arise in large class actions,
courts may seek to apply their own version of cy pres by effectuating as closely as possible the intent of
the legislature in providing the legal remedies on which the main cause of action was based.").
84. Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions, 96
YALE L.J. 1591, 1600 & 1605 (1987) (arguing that "the best option for most small claim consumer class
actions is a single, class-wide distribution" in the form "of an equitable trust designed to benefit the
injured class," and suggesting that charities would be "appropriate recipients" of the trust funds);
Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in
Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 732 (1987) (arguing that "the consumer trust fund
should be used creatively for the 'next best' distribution of funds that remain in consumer class action
settlements and damage awards"). Both works are cited in Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at
633-34.
85. See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (requiring that a "cy
pres distribution .. . be guided by (1) the objectives of the underlying statute(s) and (2) the interests of
the silent class members" (citing Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1307
(9th Cir. 1990))); Am. Soc'y of Travel Agents v. United Airlines, Inc. (In re Airline Comm'n Antitrust
Litig.), 307 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he unclaimed funds should be distributed for a purpose
as near as possible to the legitimate objectives underlying the lawsuit, the interests of class members,
and the interests of those similarly situated." (citing Am. Soc'y of Travel Agents v. United Airlines, Inc.
(In re Airline Comm'n Antitrust Litig.), 268 F.3d 619, 625-26 (8th Cir. 2001))). See also Shepherd,
supra note 43, at 452.
86. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004).
87. Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 624 (rejecting cy pres in class actions because its
use "contravenes important constitutional and procedural limitations").
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criticizes courts for invoking cy pres to distribute unclaimed funds without
even trying to "indirectly compensate members of the injured class."88
Whether the analogy to the trust context is apt or not, litigants and
courts have enthusiastically latched onto cy pres as a potential solution to
the problem of unclaimed class action settlement funds. As we will see,
while courts increasingly prefer cy pres to the alternative means of
distributing unclaimed funds considered above in Part 111,89 this solution,
too, has serious problems. Parts V and VI will describe these flaws and
illustrate them with analyses of two recent cases. Part VII will then offer a
slate of pragmatic recommendations to limit and tailor the use of cy pres to
better serve the interests of absent class members.
V. PROBLEMS WITH CY PRES DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE CLASS
ACTION CONTEXT
Courts have adapted the cy pres doctrine to distribute unclaimed funds
in the class action context because they view it as superior to reversion,
escheat, or pro rata distribution to claiming class members. By ensuring
that the defendant pays the full amount of the settlement (rather than
receiving a reversion of any unclaimed portion), cy pres distributions
advance the deterrence and disgorgement objectives of the law underlying
the class claims. 90 Because the unclaimed funds are ostensibly used to
88. Id. at 635. See also id. at 637 (criticizing cy pres awards to charities that did not "constitute
even a feeble attempt to indirectly compensate victims"). In Redish's view, cy pres awards in the class
action context are not only sloppy adaptations of trust law, but also unconstitutional arrogations of
power that violate Article III of the United States Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment (at least in adjudicated actions). Id. at 622-23, 641-48 (elaborating upon "three key
constitutional flaws"). See also Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, supra note 73, at 15 (expressing concern
that "extending cy pres to litigated class actions would contravene fundamental legal principles").
Notwithstanding these arguments, cy pres distributions continue to feature prominently in many class
action settlements. In light of their prevalence, I offer pragmatic suggestions that, if implemented,
would limit the use of cy pres distributions and better tailor them to serve the interests of absent class
members. See infra Part VII. But my proposals do not address, and would not remedy, the underlying
Article III problems identified by Redish.
89. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 84, at 1600, 1614 (stating that a cy pres distribution, in the form
of an equitable trust, "forces the defendant to disgorge ill-gotten gains, deters future illegal conduct, and
compensates injured class members"); DeJarlais, supra note 84, at 767 (stating that the use of cy pres
distributions to create consumer trust funds "is a cost-effective distribution method that serves the goals
of compensation, disgorgement . .. , and deterrence"); Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 781 ("[T]he basic
argument for cy pres relief is to increase the net deterrent effect of a class action."); ALI PRINCIPLES,
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benefit the absent class members "as nearly as possible," cy pres
distributions are believed to better serve the compensatory objectives of the
underlying law than escheat, which allows the state to use the unclaimed
funds to benefit the population at large.91 Further, cy pres distributions
purportedly avoid creating a windfall for those class members who have
already claimed their portion of the settlement fund.92 So courts often
prefer cy pres distributions to reversion, escheat, and supplemental
distributions to claimants.
But while cy pres distributions may avoid the perceived drawbacks of
the alternative means of distribution considered in Part III, they often have
problems of their own.
A. CY PRES DISTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS WELL-TAILORED TO
SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS

In theory, cy pres distributions are supposed to serve the interests of
the absent class members "as nearly as possible." In practice, however,
they often stray far from this goal. 93 Courts have approved settlement
agreements that authorized the distribution of unclaimed funds, or direct
payments by defendants, to charities that bore little relationship to the
absent class members or the laws underlying their claims. 94 In some cases,
supra note 11, § 3.07 cmt. b (stating that cy pres is preferable to reversion to the defendant because
reversion "would undermine the deterrence function of class actions and the underlying substantive-law
basis of the recovery by rewarding the alleged wrongdoer simply because distribution to the class would
not be viable"). But see Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supranote 9, at 650 (arguing that Rule 23 "is a legally
inappropriate device" for deterring unlawful behavior in the absence of an effective remedial
framework built into the substantive law).
91. But see Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 622, 623 (viewing the use of cy pres in the
class action context to achieve deterrence and compensation as a "troubling .. .part of the modem class
action" since, "[i]n a variety of ways, use of cy pres threatens to create or foster 'pathologies' of the
modem class action"; and viewing cy pres as creating only an "illusion of class compensation").
92. E.g., Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. (Van Gemert 11), 553 F.2d 812, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1977)
(declining to approve a distribution of unclaimed funds to claiming class members to avoid a windfall).
93. See, e.g., Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 634 ("Courts seem to feel no need to find
a form of relief that will ultimately have the effect of indirectly compensating as-yet uncompensated
class members."); Yospe, supra note 42, at 1023-26 (discussing the lack of a nexus between a plaintiff
class and residual fund beneficiaries).
94. Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, supra note 73, at 12 (describing a case in which "none of the
recipient charities . . . [bore] any logical relationship to the plaintiff class or the asserted claims" (citing
Brief for Objector-Appellant at 19, Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 1055129))).
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the funds were distributed (or proposed to be distributed) via cy pres to
charities that served a geographical area in which few, if any, class
members resided. 95 In other cases, the proposed cy pres recipients were
charities whose good works, while unquestioned, were wholly unrelated to
the wrongs challenged in the class action litigation. 9 6 For example, in a
class action alleging price-fixing by vendors of NASCAR race souvenirs,
the court approved a cy pres distribution to ten charities, including the
Make-a-Wish Foundation and the American Red Cross, which bore no
discernible relationship to the absent class members or their claims. 97 In
approving the distribution, the court relied on precedents approving
distributions to "non-profit groups unrelated to the plaintiffs' original
claims." 9 8
95.

E.g., Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1040 (concluding that approval of the cy pres distribution was an

abuse of discretion in part because the class included persons residing throughout the United States,
whereas two-thirds of the proposed donations would have been made to local charities in Los Angeles);

Am. Soc'y of Travel Agents v. United Airlines, Inc. (In re Airline Comm'n Antitrust Litig.), 268 F.3d
619, 626 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a cy pres distribution to "mostly local recipients" in a class action
that was national in scope); Houck v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 502 (7th Cir. 1989)
(setting aside grants to two Chicago law schools and urging the district court upon remand of a
nationwide class action "to consider to some degree a broader nationwide use of its cy pres discretion");

Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 362 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (rejecting a
proposed distribution because "the relief proposed . .. would be limited to organizations based in the

Philadelphia area"). But see Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1997)
(affirming a cy pres distribution of unclaimed funds to support scholarships for high school students
living in the three Arkansas counties and the three Louisiana parishes in which most of the class
members lived).
96. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that the charity
named in the district court order "does not directly or indirectly benefit" the class); Fears v. Wilhelmina

Model Agency, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4911 (HB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48151 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007) (in
a class action alleging price-fixing in the modeling industry, approving a cy pres distribution to charities

providing services of benefit to women in general, even though only a slim majority of the class
members were female and the charities did not purport to advance the policy objectives underlying the
antitrust law), vacated on other grounds, 315 F. App'x 333 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order); In re

Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1395-99 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
97. In re Motorsports Merch., 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1395-99 (explaining that the "[c]ourt has
attempted to identify charitable organizations that may at least indirectly benefit the members of the

class of NASCAR racing fans").
98. Id. at 1394 (citing Superior Beverage Co. v.
(N.D. Ill. 1993); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.,
1991), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 934 F.2d 323
Model Agency, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4911 (HB), 2005 U.S.

Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 478-79
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2553 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5,
(7th Cir. 1991)). Accord Fears v. Wilhelmina
Dist. LEXIS 7961, at *34-38 (S.D.N.Y. May 5,
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In another case, this one alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the
modeling industry, the district court approved a cy pres distribution to a
number of charities that provided services of benefit to women in general
even though only approximately 60 percent of the class members were
female and the charities did not purport to advance the policy objectives
underlying the antitrust law at issue in the case. 99 In sum, as the Third
Circuit explained,
Cy pres distributions . . . are inferior to direct distributions to the class
because they only imperfectly serve the purpose of the underlying causes
of action-to compensate class members . . .. Cy pres distributions
imperfectly serve that purpose by substituting for that direct
compensation an indirect benefit that is at best attenuated and at worse
illusory. 0 0
B. CY PRES DISTRIBUTIONS MAY SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE
DEFENDANT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CLASS

Not only do some cy pres distributions fail to serve the interests of the
class or the policies underlying their claims, but some stray so far as to
serve the defendant's interests at the expense of the class. Typically, when
a defendant makes a donation to charity in lieu of direct payments to class
members, the defendant enjoys the good will and good publicity (and
possibly even the tax deduction) associated with making a charitable gift,
while the class members may receive little, if any, benefit from the
charity's activities.10 1 Consider, for example, the class action filed against
Kellogg, the cereal company, in which plaintiffs alleged that
advertisements had falsely claimed that children who ate Kellogg's cereal
for breakfast were more attentive in school than other children. 102 As part
of the class action settlement, Kellogg agreed to donate $5.5 million worth
2005) (noting that the "courts' broad equitable powers now permit use of funds for other public interest
purposes by educational, charitable, and other public service organizations" (quoting Superior Beverage
Co., 827 F. Supp. at 479)), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom; Masters v. Wilhelmina Model
Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court had discretion to allocate
unclaimed funds as treble damages to claiming class members).
99. Fears, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48151, at *36-44. See also Fears, 2005 US. Dist. LEXIS
7961, at *34-53, 36 n.14.
100. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Mirfasihi v.
Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2004)).
101. See, e.g., SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
("[D]efendants reap goodwill from the donation of monies to a good cause.").
102. Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 861-62 (9th Cir. 2012).
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of its products to charity and to establish a $2.75 million settlement fund to
satisfy class members' claims. Unclaimed funds would be donated to
charities that feed the indigent, to be chosen by the parties and approved by
the court.10 3 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court order approving the settlement, holding that the cy pres
awards were "divorced from the concerns embodied in consumer protection
laws" invoked by the class; charities that feed the indigent have "little or
nothing" to do with consumer protection. 104 Recognizing the need to "pay[]
special attention" to settlement terms indicating "incentives favoring
pursuit of self-interest rather than the class's interests," 105 the court
questioned whether Kellogg could treat the distribution of cereal to
organizations that feed the poor and its donation of the unclaimed funds as
tax-deductible charitable donations, and whether it could donate the
unclaimed funds in place of a charitable donation it had already pledged to

make. 106
In other cases, courts have approved cy pres distributions to
organizations in which the defendants had pre-existing interests.10 7 For
example, in a class action brought on behalf of purchasers of satellite
television packages of National Football League ("NFL") games, the court
approved a cy pres distribution of unclaimed funds to NFL Youth
Education Town Centers, which were youth centers funded in part by the
defendant NFL. Likewise, in a case against Facebook, the Ninth Circuit
approved a settlement pursuant to which Facebook paid no money to class
members other than the named representatives, but paid $3 million in
attorneys' fees and $6.5 million to set up a new charity to be run by
Facebook's own Director of Public Policy together with two other

directors. 108
103. Id. at 862-63, 866.
104. Id. at 866 (quoting Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011)).
105. Id. at 867 (quoting Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 960 (9th Cir. 2003)).
106. Id. at 867-68. See also Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 64 (D.D.C. 2010)
(expressing concern that the defendant would use the cy pres distribution "as a promotional tool").
107. See, e.g., In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1058 (S.D. Cal. 2013)
(approving a cy pres distribution to a law school attended by both defense counsel and class counsel);
Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club Ltd., 362 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (approving a
cy pres distribution to community youth centers that were funded in part by the defendant).
108. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817-18, 820-22 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom.
Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (mem.). The settlement agreement also established a Board of Legal
Advisors for the new charity consisting of defense counsel and class counsel. Id at 817-18. See also
infra Part VI.B.
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C. CY PRES DISTRIBUTIONS MAY SERVE THE INTERESTS OF CLASS
COUNSEL AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CLASS

Cy pres distributions are subject to criticism not only because they
may fail to serve the interests of the class and may even benefit the
defendants whose wrongdoing gave rise to the suit, but also because they
may benefit class counsel at the expense of the class. Since attorneys' fees
in class actions are often calculated as a percentage of the recovery,1 09 class
counsel benefits if the overall recovery is large regardless of whether class
members actually receive it. 110 In fact, awarding attorneys' fees based on
the size of the entire settlement rather than the amount actually claimed by
class members can create a conflict of interest between class counsel and
the class. 11 As the Third Circuit noted:
109. Although courts may use either the lodestar or percentage of recovery approach in
calculating fees, In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2013), they "have
trended toward the percentage-of-the-fund approach in cases involving the creation of a common fund
for the class." Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 786. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Courts use the percentage of recovery
method in common fund cases on the theory that the class would be unjustly enriched if it did not
compensate the counsel responsible for generating the valuable fund bestowed on the class."); Bowling
v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1261, 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (noting a "clear trend ... to award a
reasonable percentage of the [common] fund" (citing Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, I F.3d 1261,
1267 (D.C. Cir. 1993))); In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 736 F.
Supp. 1007, 1009, 1016 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
110. See, e.g., SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that
"the attorney's fee award is exaggerated by cy pres distributions that do not truly benefit the plaintiff
class"); Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 640 ("[O]ne of the primary effects, if not purposes, of
class action cy pres is to inflate the size of class attorneys' fees."); Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, supra
note 73, at 13 ("Cy pres awards also create the potential for conflicts of interest by ensuring that class
attorneys are able to reap exorbitant fees regardless of whether the absent class members are adequately
compensated."); George Krueger & Judd Serotta, Op-Ed., Our Class-Action System is Unconstitutional,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SBl21798040044415147 (bemoaning "that
attorneys . . . have received fees that are entirely divorced from the harm actually recognized by the
people they supposedly represent"). Stated more pointedly, "the fundamental flaw in cy pres
relief . .. is that it provides no incentive to class counsel to negotiate the optimal class settlement-the
settlement that maximizes the net social benefit to a class of optimal size and claim structure."
Tidmarsh, supra note I1, at 782.
Ill. Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 772, 782. Redish frames this concern in terms of due process:
"By disincentivizing class attorneys from vigorously pursuing individualized compensation for absent
class members, cy pres threatens the due process rights of those class members. In this manner, the
practice unconstitutionally undermines the due process obligation of those representing absent class
members to vigorously advocate on their behalf and defend their legal rights." Redish, Julian & Zyontz,
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Cy pres distributions . .. present a potential conflict of interest between
class counsel and their clients because the inclusion of a cy pres
distribution may increase a settlement fund, and with it attorneys' fees,
without increasing the direct benefit to the class. . . . Arrangements such
as [these]... decouple class counsel's financial incentives from those of
the class... 112

Moreover, the perennial risk of collusion between the defendant and
class counsel 1 3 is enhanced in this context since defendants may prefer cy
pres distributions for the reasons described in Part V.B above, and class
counsel's interest in maximizing its fees is satisfied regardless of whether
the settlement funds are paid to class members or distributed cy pres.1 14 A
supra note 9, at 650 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1940)). On the basis of an empirical
study, he concludes that "cy pres awards .. . can also increase the likelihood and absolute amount of
attorneys' fees awarded without directly, or even indirectly, benefiting the plaintiff." Id. at 661.

112. In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 173; id. at 178 (quoting Int'l Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters,
530 U.S. 1223, 1224 (2000) (statement of O'Connor, J., respecting the denial of the petition for a writ
of certiorari)). See also Int'l Precious Metals, 530 U.S. at 1224 (maintaining that the approval of
attorneys' fees without considering "whether there must at least be some rational connection between
the fee award and the amount of the actual distribution to the class" could have "several troubling
consequences").

113.

See, e.g., Jones v. GN Netcom, Inc. (In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.), 654 F.3d

935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that courts "must be particularly vigilant . .

for more subtle signs that

class counsel ha[s] allowed pursuit of their own self-interests . . . to infect the negotiations"); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the PrivateAttorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is

Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 232-33 (1983) ("[T]he plaintiffs attorney is subject to a serious
conflict of interest-one that can distort the settlement process and reduce the deterrent effect of private
litigation-whenever the determination of the fee award is not made a sufficiently direct function of the
size of the recovery so as to align the interests of the private enforcer with those of the class he purports

to represent."); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 473 (2000) ("The
defendant may even agree not to oppose class counsel's application for exorbitant fees . . . if class
counsel agrees to the low-ball offer. The pressure on class counsel to collude with the defendant in this
manner may be extreme." (footnote omitted)); Brian Wolfman, Judges! Stop Deferring to Class-Action
Lawyers, 2 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM ONLINE 80, 86 (2013) (noting the absentees' inability to monitor
class counsel and the resultant "possibility of collusive (or at least sub-optimal) deals").

114.

See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004) (questioning

whether it would "be too cynical to speculate that what may be going on here is that class counsel
wanted a settlement that would give them a generous fee and [the defendant] wanted a settlement that
would extinguish 1.4 million claims against it at no cost to itself"); Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note
9, at 621 ("[I]n many class actions it is solely the use of cy pres that assures distribution of a ...

fund

sufficiently large to guarantee substantial attorneys' fees...."); Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 768 n.2,
782 (noting that "the desire for a larger fee is one reason that the cy pres approach . . . may be attractive
to counsel," and stating that "cy pres may provide an incentive for some rapacious putative class
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cy pres distribution coupled with a "clear sailing" agreement by which the
defendant agrees not to challenge class counsel's fee application would
advance the interests of both class counsel and the defendant at the expense
of the class.115
D. CY PREs DISTRIBUTIONS MAY CREATE AN APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY

Cy pres distributions not only exacerbate the risk of conflicts of
interest between class counsel and the class, but they also may enhance the
risk that judges will, or will appear to, engage in improper behavior. 116
Rather than designate specific beneficiaries to whom unclaimed funds
should be distributed or list potential beneficiaries from which the court
may choose cy pres recipients,1 17 some settlement agreements simply give
the judge discretion to designate a charity or charities to which unclaimed
funds should be donated."' If this discretion is not constrained, the judge
counsel to undercut efforts to achieve a settlement large enough to deliver individual relief to class
members").
115. See, e.g., Jones, 654 F.3d at 947 ("[A] 'clear sailing' arrangement providing for the payment
of attorneys' fees separate and apart from class funds ... carries 'the potential of enabling a defendant
to pay class counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on
behalf of the class."' (quoting Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir.
2000)); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class
Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 48-49, 48 n.58 (2002) (explaining that defendants often lack an
incentive to scrutinize class counsel's fees if they are paid from the settlement fund); Tidmarsh, supra
note 11, at 785 & n.58 (describing clear sailing arrangements).
116. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2013) (expressing "skepticism
about using the residue of class actions to make contributions to judges' favorite charities"); Nachshin
v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he specter of judges . . dealing in the
distribution and solicitation of settlement money may create the appearance of impropriety." (quoting
SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))); Yospe, supra note 42, at
1027 (noting that discretion regarding the choice of a cy pres recipient may "lead to questions of bias").
117. The ALI Principles provide that "[flhe court, when feasible, should require the parties to
identify a recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class" and
further direct the court to "give weight to the parties' choice of recipient." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note
11, § 3.07(c) & cmt. b (emphasis added).
118. E.g., Rohn v. Tap Pharm. Prods. (In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.), 677 F.3d 21,
24 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that the settlement agreement provided that "all unclaimed funds would go
into a cy pres fund to be distributed at the discretion of the trial judge"); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines, Inc.,
880 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1989) (reviewing a cy pres distribution made pursuant to a consent decree,
which provided that "[a]ny residual fund may be utilized, after all payment of backpay, as the Court
directs"). See also Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1037, 1040 (rejecting a settlement that authorized donations to
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might choose to distribute unclaimed funds to "favored charities, alma
maters, and the like."I 19 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
has noted, "having judges decide how to distribute cy pres awards both
taxes judicial resources and risks creating the appearance of judicial
impropriety."

20

Thus, while judges may prefer cy pres distributions to the alternatives
of reversion, escheat and supplemental distributions to claimants, the
proposed "solution" has problems of its own, including an appearance of
impropriety by the judges themselves. We turn now to two cases that
vividly illustrate these problems.
VI. VIVID ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PROBLEMS WITH CY PRES
DISTRIBUTIONS
A. IN RE BABY PRODUCTSANTITR USTLITIGA TION
In its first opinion addressing the use of cy pres in the class action
context, 12 1 the Third Circuit reviewed a district court order approving the
three charities agreed to by the parties upon the district court's suggestion).
119. Adam Liptak, Doling Out Other People's Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/washington/26bar.html. See also R. Robin McDonald, Retirement
Ends JQC Probe; Judge Douglas Pullen to Step Down Amid Questions Involving Unserved Prison
Term, Distributionof 'Cy Pres' Funds, DAILY REP., Aug. 24, 2011, at 1 (reporting the retirement of a
judge "in the middle of an ethical inquiry" by a judicial commission; noting that the investigation was
exploring, among other issues, the judge's approval of distributions of cy pres funds to his
undergraduate and law school alma maters, following which the university awarded the judge an
honorary degree); Daniel J. Popeo, Online Privacy Organizations Get "Buzzed" on Millions from
Google Lawsuit Settlement, FORBES (June 2, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/docket/2011/06/02/
online-privacy-organizations-get-buzzed-on-millions-from-google-lawsuit-settlement
(discussing a
settlement in which the judge independently nominated the university at which he lectured as a cy pres
recipient). For an extreme case, see Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Bamberger, 354 S.W.3d 576, 578-79 (Ky. 2011)
(ordering the permanent disbarment of a judge who, after an ex parte meeting with plaintiffs' counsel
and their trial consultant, approved the establishment of a charitable entity to which the attorneys
directed $20 million in "excess funds" and from which they later received large monthly directors' fees;
the judge himself "accepted the plaintiffs' attorneys' invitation to become a paid director" of the
charitable entity and received $48,150 from it).
120. In re Lupron Mktg., 677 F.3d at 38.
121. In an earlier Third Circuit case, the late Judge Joseph Weis expressed an opinion regarding
cy pres, which the majority did not address. See In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 36364 (3d Cir. 2010) (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting) (expressing reservations about the invocation of
the cy pres doctrine in the class action context).
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settlement in In re Baby Products Antitrust Litigation,12 2 which sought to
resolve two consolidated antitrust class actions filed against Toys "R" Us,
Babies "R" Us, and manufacturers of baby products. 1 23 Filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the class actions
alleged that the defendants had conspired to set a price floor for certain
products, thereby causing class members to pay more than they otherwise
would have paid for the products.1 24 The district court certified a class of
purchasers and created several subclasses for persons who had purchased
specific products during particular time periods.1 2 5 About eighteen months
later, the parties to the two class actions jointly moved for preliminary
approval of a settlement.1 26
After a fairness hearing, the district court approved a settlement of the
claims for $35.5 million, of which one-third would be paid to class counsel
for attorneys' fees ($11.83 million) and litigation expenses ($2.23
million).1 27 Under the settlement, claimants who submitted proof of
purchase of a qualifying baby product would receive 20 percent of the
purchase price (the amount they overpaid due to defendants' illegal
behavior), but claimants who lacked proof of purchase would receive only
five dollars.' 28 Thus, a class member who purchased a three hundred dollar
stroller covered by the settlement would have been eligible to receive sixty
dollars if she submitted proof of purchase. If the portion of the settlement
fund allocated to a particular subclass were not exhausted, members of that
subclass who had submitted proof of purchase would be eligible to receive
up to three times the original amount of their award,1 29 consistent with the
122.
123.
124.
125.

In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id at 168-70, 181.
Id at 170.
Id. See McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (creating

subclasses). The second class action was filed later in the year. Class Action Complaint, Elliott v. Toys

"R" Us, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-06151-AB (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2009), ECF No. 1.
126.

Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement, for Certification of Settlement Classes

and for Permission to Disseminate Class Notice, McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-0242AB (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2011), ECF No. 38. See also In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 170 (stating that the
parties in the two class actions "signed an agreement consolidating and settling their lawsuits").

127. McDonough v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d 329 (E.D. Pa. 2011), vacated by In re
Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 181-82. See also In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 170 (describing the district
court orders).

128.
129.

In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
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Clayton Act's provision for treble damages.1 30 If funds still remained,
qualifying members of other subclasses would be eligible to receive treble
damages. Finally, if funds remained after providing treble damages to all
claimants who submitted proof of purchase, the remaining funds would be
donated to charitable organizations selected by the court from among those
suggested by the parties.' 3 1 Thus, it appeared that the parties had negotiated
a settlement agreement that would pay significant sums of money to class
members and employed cy pres only as a last resort.
But appearances can be deceiving. In fact, because the vast majority of
claimants failed to submit proof of purchase and therefore qualified to
receive only five dollars each, it turned out that class members would
receive only about $3 million of the $35.5 million settlement, or less than
10 percent of the total fund.1 32 Reviewing the settlement on an appeal filed
by an objecting absentee class member, the Third Circuit vacated the orders
approving it because the district court lacked the facts needed to assess its
fairness.1 33
In explaining its decision, the Third Circuit focused on the
informational deficiencies suffered by the district court and the potential
conflict of interest between the class and its counsel.1 34 In terms of
informational deficiencies, the Third Circuit emphasized the lower court's
lack of awareness that only approximately $3 million dollars of the
settlement fund would be distributed to class members, with the rest of the
$21.5 million available after attorneys' fees and expenses to be paid to
charities.' 35 Moreover, in approving the five-dollar cap on compensation
for those lacking proof of purchase, the district court had assumed that the
standard of proof required for a higher award would be "fairly low" and a
risk of fraud justified it. 136 But the small fraction of prospective claimants
who actually submitted proof of purchase belied the assumption about the
ease of proving purchase. 37 In short, what concerned the Third Circuit was
that the district court "approved the settlement without being made aware
that almost all claimants would fall into the $5 compensation category,
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 171.
Id.
Id. at 175.
See infra notes 240-242, 271-273 and accompanying text.
In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 175.
Id.
Id
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resulting in minimal (and we doubt sufficient) compensation going directly
to class members."13 8
In that one sentence, the Third Circuit not only chided the district
court for approving a cy pres distribution without the requisite facts, but it
also chastised class counsel for negotiating a settlement that appeared to
put lots of money into the hands of the class while in fact achieving very
little in that regard. But that was not the court's only criticism of class
counsel. Earlier in the opinion, the Third Circuit subtly chastised counsel
for "not provid[ing] . . . information"13 9 to the district court about the very
low claims rate, and later it questioned "whether agreeing to a settlement
with such a restrictive claims process was in the best interest of the
class." 140 Reinforcing its reservations about class counsel's efforts, the
appellate court encouraged the parties on remand to consider altering the
settlement's terms to "provide greater direct benefit to the class, such as by
increasing the $5 payment or lowering the evidentiary bar for receiving a
higher award." 1 41

In vacating the award of attorneys' fees and addressing the objector's
argument that such fees should be discounted whenever a portion of the
settlement is distributed cy pres,1 42 the Third Circuit commented more
explicitly on the potential conflict of interest between class counsel and the
class:
We appreciate . . . that awarding attorneys' fees based on the entire

settlement amount rather than individual distributions creates a potential
conflict of interest between absent class members and their counsel.
"Arrangements such as [these] . .. decouple class counsel's financial
incentives from those of the class . . .. They potentially undermine the

underlying purposes of class actions by providing defendants with a
powerful means to enticing class counsel to settle lawsuits in a manner
detrimental to the class." . . . Class members are not indifferent to

whether funds are distributed to them or to cy pres recipients, and class
counsel should not be either. 143
While declining to adopt a categorical rule that would require district
138. Id. at 176.
139. Id. at 175.
140. Id at 176.
141. Id. at 175.
142. Id. at 177.
143. Id. at 178 (citation omitted) (quoting Int'1 Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223,
1224 (2000) (statement of O'Connor, J., respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of cert.)).
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courts to discount attorneys' fees whenever some or all of the settlement
fund would be distributed cy pres,144 the Third Circuit did encourage
district courts to decrease attorneys' fee awards when they have "reason to
believe that counsel has not met its responsibility to seek an award that
adequately prioritizes direct benefit to the class."1 4 5 Here, while the Baby
Products settlement "had the potential to compensate class members
significantly," the Third Circuit concluded that "the current distribution of
settlement funds arguably overcompensates class counsel at the expense of
the class."' 4 6
Thus, Baby Products illustrates how a potential conflict of interest
between class counsel and the class can result in a settlement that
distributes too little money to the class and too much to charity cy pres. It
also illustrates the importance of ensuring that the trial court has accurate
and complete information about the proposed settlement and the likelihood
that it will provide direct benefit to the class.1 47
B. LANE V. FACEBOOK, INC.

If the Baby Products settlement is subject to criticism because class
members received such a small percentage of the settlement fund, the
settlement in Lane v. Facebook, Inc. 148 is even more problematic, both
because the class members received no money (indeed no relief)
whatsoever and because the cy pres recipient was a new charity in which
144.
145.

Id.
Id. The court invoked both a comment to the ALI Principles and a provision of the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") as support for the proposition that "the actual benefit provided
to the class is an important consideration when determining attorneys' fees." Id at 179 & n.13 (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012) (requiring courts to calculate attorneys' fees based on the value of coupons
that are redeemed rather than the face value of coupons issued in class action settlements) and ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, § 3.13 cmt. a ("[B]ecause cy pres payments ... only indirectly benefit the
class, the court need not give such payments the same full value for purposes of setting attorneys' fees
as would be given to direct recoveries by the class.")). See also infra notes 203-213 and accompanying
text.
146. In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 179.
147. At the same time, the case illustrates the difficulty of ensuring that the trial court will receive
accurate and complete information in any settlement class action; once class counsel and defense
counsel reach a settlement in a case, it is in their shared interest to withhold from the court any
information that calls the adequacy of the settlement into question. See infra Parts VII.B & C for
proposals to help address these informational deficiencies.
148. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane,
134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (mem.).
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the defendant had an interest. Moreover, while the problematic settlement
in Baby Products was vacated by the Third Circuit, 14 9 the troubling
settlement in the Facebook litigation was actually affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit. ISO

The plaintiffs in Lane challenged a program called Beacon, which
Facebook launched in late 2007. Beacon shared information about
Facebook members' Internet activity with their online "friends."' 5 1 In
particular, Beacon announced on members' Facebook profiles their
interactions with participating websites that had contracted with Facebook
to participate in the program. For example, if a Facebook member rented a
movie from Blockbuster.com, Facebook would announce the movie rental
on the member's personal profile and on her friends' "News Feeds."' 52
Facebook did not require members' affirmative consent to participate in the
Beacon program, and many members complained that Beacon resulted in
the posting of private information. 153 For instance, the named plaintiff,
Sean Lane, had bought a ring from Overstock.com as a Christmas present
for his wife; but Facebook ruined the surprise by sharing the news with his
seven hundred Facebook friends before he gave the ring to his wife and by
revealing, perhaps to her disappointment, "that he had bought [the ring]
cheaply." 54
Nineteen plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California against Facebook and the
online companies participating in the Beacon program.1 55 The complaint
alleged violations of various federal and state privacy statutes, 15 6 including
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,157 the Computer
149. In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 181.
150. Lane, 696 F.3d at 826.
151. Id. at 816.
152. Class Action Complaint at 23, 27, Lane v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:08-cv-03845 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 12, 2008), ECF No. 1. See also Lane, 696 F.3d at 816.
153. Lane, 696 F.3d at 816. Opting out of the program was difficult. Id. at 827 (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting). See also Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 8 (2013) (statement of Roberts, C.J., respecting the
denial of certiorari) ("[A] member had to affirmatively opt out [using a] pop-up window that appeared
for about ten seconds . . . .").

154.
155.
156.
157.

Lane, 696 F.3d at 827 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
Class Action Complaint, supranote 152, at 2. See also Lane, 696 F.3d at 816.
Class Action Complaint, supranote 152, at 3-4.
18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012).
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Fraud and Abuse Act,' 58 the Video Privacy Protection Act, 5 9 the
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act,1 60 and the California Computer
Crime Law.161

While Facebook's motion to dismiss was pending, the parties engaged
in protracted settlement negotiations and eventually submitted a settlement
agreement to the district court for preliminary approval.1 62 Pursuant to the
settlement agreement, Facebook agreed to permanently terminate the
Beacon program,1 63 although the agreement inexplicably permitted
Facebook "to reinstitute the same program under a different name."1 64 In
addition, Facebook agreed to pay $9.5 million to settle the claims and not
to oppose class counsel's request for approximately $3 million of that
amount for attorneys' fees, administrative costs, and incentive payments to
the named representatives.' 6 5 None of the remaining $6.5 million would be
paid to absent class members; instead, it would be used to set up a new
charity, the Digital Trust Foundation ("DTF"), which was intended to
"fund and sponsor programs designed to educate users, regulators[,] and
enterprises regarding critical issues relating to protection of identity and
personal information online through user control, and the protection of
users from online threats."1 66 DTF would be run by a three-member board
of directors; one of the initial directors would be Facebook's Director of
Public Policy.1 67 Class counsel and Facebook's counsel would serve on
DTF's Board of Legal Advisors.1 68 The settlement purported to bind not
158. Id. § 1030.
159. Id. §2710.
160. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 (West 2009).
161. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 2010).
162. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 826 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v.
Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (mem.).
163. Id.
164. Id at 828 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Apparently this form of "relief' is one that Facebook has
offered elsewhere. See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 945 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (approving,
in a class action that challenged Facebook's "Sponsored Stories" program, which used the names and
likenesses of Facebook users to promote products and services, a settlement that neither "ended
Sponsored Stories, [nor] set up an 'opt-in' rather than a[n] 'opt-out' system, [nor] even provided for

members to be paid for use of their names and likenesses").
165. Lane, 696 F.3d at 817; id. at 832 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (describing "a version of a clear
sailing agreement").
166.

Id. at 817 (quoting the settlement agreement).

167.
168.

Id.
Id. at 817-18.
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only the class members on whose behalf the suit had been filed, but also a
broader group of Facebook users who would be precluded from suing
Facebook for harms caused by the Beacon program.169 Following a fairness
hearing, at which several class members voiced their objections, the district
court certified a settlement class and approved the settlement.1 70
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court order,
concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding the
settlement "fair, reasonable, and adequate." 7' Several features of the
settlement call that conclusion into serious question, however. First, the
value of the class members' claims may have exceeded the $9.5 million
that Facebook agreed to pay to settle them.1 72 For example, some of the
class members had claims under the Video Privacy Protection Act
("VPPA"), which bars "video tape service providers" from disclosing
"personally identifiable information" about its consumers. 7 1 VPPA
"provides for liquidated damages in the amount of $2500," as well as
punitive damages and attorneys' fees, for violations of the act.' 7 4 While
Facebook had a "good argument that it was not itself a 'video tape service
provider"' under VPPA, it "still had a risk of some sort of vicarious, joint,
or 'civil conspiracy' liability. If found liable, it was a deep pocket target for
the punitive damages for which the statute expressly provides."' 7 5 Once
class counsel had reached a settlement with the defendant, however, it no
longer had an incentive to present the court with proof of the strength of
these claims. Given that the class members lacked the resources and
incentive to monitor class counsel, the trial court may have lacked the
information needed to assess the adequacy of the settlement.1 7 6
169. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (statement of Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of
certiorari); Lane, 696 F.3d at 832 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
170. Lane, 696 F.3d at 818; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Approving
Settlement at 3-5, 10, Lane v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:08-cv-03845-RS (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2010), ECF
No. 123.
171. Lane, 696 F.3d at 818, 825 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)).
172. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (No. 13-136), 2013
WL 3944136 (noting that the "settlement approval affirmed by the Ninth Circuit ma[de] no attempt to
estimate the value of class members' claims").
173. Lane, 696 F.3d at 822 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2012)).
174. Id. at 822, 828 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2)).
175. Id. at 833 (footnote omitted).
176. Id. at 829 (noting that absent class members "are in no position to prevent class counsel from
pursuing his own interests at their expense").
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Second, even if $9.5 million adequately valued the class claims, not
one penny of that money was paid to the absentees. They did not even
receive coupons,' 7 7 a form of compensation suspicious enough to prompt
regulation by Congress.' 78 While the Ninth Circuit concluded that it would
have been too burdensome to distribute the settlement fund directly to class
members because their individual claims were "de minimis,"'7 1 that
conclusion derives at least in part from the questionable size of the
settlement fund and the attorneys' agreement, at the end of the day, to
enlarge the size of the class.' 80
Third, serious doubts surround the decision to use the settlement funds
to create the DTF. After all, the defendant, Facebook, retained a significant
degree of control over the cy pres recipient, creating a conflict of
interest.18 1 Moreover, while Ninth Circuit precedent requires consideration
of the recipient's relation to the class and its "record of service" in
remedying the types of wrongs alleged by the class,1 82 DTF had no record
of service against which to judge its commitment and ability to serve the
interests of the class. 83 Nor was it created to "advance the objectives of the
statutes relied upon in bringing suit."184 While all of the federal statutes
relied upon by the class were designed to "prevent[] the unauthorized
access or disclosure of private information, . . . the DTF's sole stated

purpose" was to provide education "on how to protect Internet privacy
'through user control.""8 5 As Judge Smith stated in his dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc,
177. Id. at 832 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012) (regulating coupon settlements in class action litigation). See infra
notes 199-215 and accompanying text.
179. Lane, 696 F.3d at 824-25.
180. Accord Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 172, at 14 ("[T]he size of the fund, the
number of class members, the absence of subclasses-were components of the settlement itself.").
181. Lane, 696 F.3d at 834 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (noting the "incentive for
collusion ... where . .. there is nothing to stop Facebook and class counsel from managing the charity
to serve their interests").
182. Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1990)
(setting aside a cy pres distribution in part because the recipient did not have a "substantial record of
service").

183.

Lane, 696 F.3d at 834 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("The cy pres award in this case goes to a

new entity with no past performance at all.").

184. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 709 F.3d 791, 793-94 (9th Cir. 2013) (Smith, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
185. Id at 794 (quoting Lane, 696 F.3d at 822).
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[A]n appropriate cy pres recipient must be dedicated to protecting
consumers from the precise wrongful conduct about which plaintiffs
complain. But an organization that focuses on protecting privacy solely
through 'user control' can never prevent unauthorized access or
disclosure of private information where the alleged wrongdoer already
186
has unfettered access to a user's records.

In sum, it is hard to see how the cy pres remedy proposed here-the
creation of the DTF-bore "a direct and substantial nexus to the interests of
absent class members and thus properly provide[d] for the 'next best
distribution' to the class."' 87
As in Baby Products, the problems in Lane likely arose because class
counsel's self-interest in securing a healthy fee and the defendant's interest
in settling the class claims cheaply could both be satisfied by a cy pres
distribution that denied the class sufficient direct benefit, and because the
courts lacked either the inclination or the information needed to carefully
scrutinize the settlement.
VII. PRAGMATIC PROPOSALS TO MINIMIZE RELIANCE ON, AND
TO IMPROVE THE EFFICACY OF, CY PRES DISTRIBUTIONS
While cy pres distributions may be necessary when direct payments to
individual class members are economically infeasible, the cases analyzed in
Part VI demonstrate that endemic agency problems in class actions
contribute to their overuse. While clients in non-class litigation have an
incentive to monitor the performance of their counsel, in the class action
context class members lack that incentive because their individual claims
are too small to justify monitoring costs. Therefore, freed from the
constraints that monitoring would impose, class counsel may seek to
maximize its fee at the expense of the class. Parties with a duty to monitor
or interest in monitoring class counsel-courts and objectors,
respectively-typically lack the information they need to perform such
monitoring. And courts themselves actually have a countervailing interest
in approving class action settlements in order to clear their own dockets.
Each of these factors plays a role in the overuse of cy pres distributions,
and therefore each must be addressed in any proposal to minimize reliance
on this often suboptimal remedy.
First, unconstrained by monitoring, class counsel may not work its
186.
187.

Id. (citations omitted).
Lane, 696 F.3d at 821.
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hardest to negotiate a settlement that maximizes recovery for the class
because its fees are the same regardless of whether the settlement fund is
paid to the class or to a charity via cy pres.' 88 This potential conflict of
interest between class counsel and the class may result in settlements that
distribute too little money to the class, too much money to charities, and
generous attorneys' fees to class counsel regardless of how well (or poorly)
they serve the class.
Second, neither the absent class members, nor potential objectors, nor
even the trial courts themselves have the information needed to monitor
class counsel's performance to ensure that counsel is trying its hardest to
secure the best recovery for the class. 8 9 By the time class counsel and the
defendant have negotiated a settlement, their interests are aligned in
obtaining judicial approval of the settlement and the court does not receive
an adversarial presentation identifying the weaknesses of the settlement.
These informational deficiencies hamper efforts to monitor, 190 and when
coupled with the potential conflict of interest described above, increase the
likelihood of sub-optimal settlements containing cy pres provisions.
Finally, the trial court may fail to vigorously scrutinize the class action
settlement to determine whether its cy pres component is necessary and, if
it is, whether it is carefully tailored to best serve the interests of the class.
Courts may have their own reasons for preferring settlements to trials, and
a judicial laissez-faire attitude may compound the foregoing problems.191
In this part, I offer four interrelated pragmatic proposals to address
these problems. The proposal regarding attorneys' fees described in Part
VII.A is designed to address the potential conflict of interest. The proposals
regarding disclosure statements and devil's advocates, advanced in Parts
VII.B and C, are designed to remedy informational deficiencies, to improve
monitoring of class counsel, and to reduce reliance on cy pres distributions.
The final proposal, described in Part VII.D, which requires courts to make
certain findings when reviewing class action settlements with cy pres
features, is designed to ensure rigorous judicial review by both trial and
appellate courts and to minimize reliance on cy pres distributions.
188.

See supra Part V.C.

189.
190.
191.

See infra notes 240-242, 259-273, and accompanying text.
See infra notes 239-241, 266-273, and accompanying text.
See infra notes 285-286 and accompanying text.
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A. PRESUMPTIVE REDUCTION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

Legal scholarship is rife with analyses of potential conflicts of interest
between class counsel and the represented class.1 92 As described in Part
V.C above, this conflict may manifest itself when class counsel negotiates a
settlement containing a cy pres distribution. If class counsel's fee is
calculated as a percentage of the total recovery,1 93 including the cy pres
distribution, then class counsel may be indifferent to whether the settlement
fund is paid to individual class members or to charities via cy pres. If
defendants (and possibly even judges) prefer cy pres distributions' 94 and
class counsel is principally motivated to maximize its fee, class counsel
may lack the incentive to push for a settlement that provides more a direct
benefit for individual class members because its fee will be the same either
way.1
192.

95

For classic treatments of the issue, see, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Understandingthe

Plaintiff's Attorney. The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through

Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671-72, 677 (1986) (discussing "the conflicts
that arise between the interests of these attorneys and their clients in class and derivative actions" and

hypothesizing that class actions "are uniquely vulnerable to collusive settlements that benefit plaintiffs
attorneys rather than their clients"); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,

58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (1991) (noting the "severe conflict of interest" that class counsel often
faces in negotiating class action settlements).
193.

"Courts generally use one of two methods for assessing the reasonableness of attorneys' fees

-a percentage-of-recovery method or a lodestar method." In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d
163, 176 (3d Cir. 2013). They "have trended toward the percentage-of-the-fund approach in cases
involving the creation of a common fund for the class." Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 786 (footnote
omitted). See also In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 177 ("[T]he Supreme Court confirmed the
permissibility of using the entire fund as the appropriate benchmark . . . ."); In re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing courts'
common usage of the percentage of recovery method in class action cases and their reliance on
"common fund" principles). Whichever method is employed, courts often use the other method to
double-check the reasonableness of the initial fee determination. See In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 176
("[I]t is sensible for a court to use a second method of fee approval to cross check its initial fee
calculation." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice

Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 333 (3d Cir. 1998))).
194.

See supraParts V.B and D.

195.

See supra Part V.C. See also John Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, Litigating in the New

Class Action World. A Guide to CAFA's Legislative History, 6 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) No. 11,
at 403, 413 (June 10, 2005) (stating that if attorneys' fees were based on the portion of a coupon
settlement distributed cy pres to charities, "class counsel would have no incentive to ensure that the

coupons [were] actually distributed to-and used by-the class members who were allegedly
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To better align the interests of class counsel and the class, and to give
class counsel a personal, financial incentive to push hard to get more
money into the hands of individual claimants (as opposed to cy pres
distributions to charities), I propose that courts alter the method they use to
calculate attorneys' fees.1 96 In particular, borrowing from the solution
Congress adopted in the Class Action Fairness Act to address the problem
of coupon settlements,1 97 I propose that courts presumptively reduce
attorneys' fees whenever all or a portion of the class action settlement is
distributed to charities cy pres.
To put this proposal in context, consider the problems posed by
coupon settlements in recent decades. To settle class action lawsuits filed
against them, defendants offered coupons to class members to purchase
their products at a reduced price.1 98 Such settlements were a win-win for
defendants because the product manufacturers did not have to pay anything
out-of-pocket to settle the claims (other than attorneys' fees to class
counsel and their own attorney), yet they benefitted from higher sales if
aggrieved").

196.

For other proposals to align the interests of the class and its counsel through the structure of

attorneys' fee awards, see, for example, Coffee, supra note 192, at 725 (encouraging the use of a
percentage of recovery attorneys' fee formula to reduce collusion and to promote self-policing);
Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principlesfor Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 94-95

(2003) (analyzing proposals "to link attorneys' fees to the amount of benefit the attorney provides the
class," but maintaining that they "capture[] only one aspect of the weak governance structure of class
actions"); and Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 784-97 (proposing three "friendly amendments" to Professor
Kevin Clermont's hybrid approach to better align interests in the context of cy pres distributions). See
also Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the ContingentFee, 63 CORNELL L. REV.

529, 546-66 (1978) (proposing a hybrid system-not focused on class actions-that would award
attorneys' fees based on the number of hours worked on behalf of a client, plus a percentage of the
portion of the recovery that exceeds the lodestar).
197. See infra notes 203-213 and accompanying text.
198. E g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 15-20 (2005) (recounting numerous examples of coupon
settlements approved by state courts). See also In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 803 (expressing suspicion
of settlements involving only "non-cash relief," such as coupons). The enactment of the Class Action
Fairness Act did not eliminate coupon settlements. E.g., In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173,

1176 (9th Cir. 2013) (reviewing the fee award in a class action challenging HP's business practices
regarding its printers' ink cartridges in which the proposed settlement offered class members
nontransferable coupons for HP printers and printer supplies that would expire six months after

issuance); Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 54-64 (D.D.C. 2010) (approving a
settlement that awarded class members vouchers for discounted tuition on other programs offered by
the defendant).
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absent class members actually used the coupons.1 99 Unfortunately, the
coupon settlements were often a lose-lose for class members because they
received no cash in the settlement and the coupons that they did receive
were of no value to them if they could not afford to use them. 200 The
problem of valueless coupons was particularly pronounced when the
coupons could not be transferred or aggregated or where they expired soon
after issuance. 201 To make matters worse, while class members received
coupons of questionable value, class counsel received substantial attorneys'
fees. 2 02 Thus, in the coupon settlement context, like the cy pres context, the
interests of the class and its counsel were "decoupl[ed]." 2 03
In an effort to regulate coupon settlements and to "curb [other]
199.

See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 808 ("[T]he certificate settlement might be little more

than a sales promotion for GM . . . .").
200. Id. at 807 ("[O]nly 14% of the class reported that they would 'definitely' or 'probably' buy a
new truck" with the coupon offered in the settlement.); id at 808 ("People of lesser financial means will
be unable to benefit comparably from the settlement.").
201.

Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived

Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695, 1699 (2006) ("Techniques for suppressing
redemption rates include . . limiting the transferability of coupons .... ); Christopher R. Leslie, A
Market-BasedApproach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49

UCLA L. REv. 991, 1015-23 (2002) (explaining how defendants diminish the value of coupon
settlements, including limits on transferability); Michael Mallow & Livia Kiser, The Elephant in the
Room: Contingency Fees and the Future of Coupon Settlements After In re HP Inkjet PrinterLitigation,

14 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 1125 (Sept. 13, 2013); James Tharin & Brian Blockovich,
Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 1443, 1445 (2005). See also In

re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 780, 807, 809-10 (describing the limits on the transferability of the
coupons).

202. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3), 119 Stat. 4, 4 (2005)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2012)) ("Class members often receive little or no benefit
from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as where . . . counsel are awarded large fees, while
leaving class members with coupons or other awards of little or no value . . . ."); S. REP. No. 109-14, at

14-20, 30 (2005).
Coupon settlements may not have been as widespread as Congress imagined and surely were
&

not the only class action settlements that awarded counsel "disproportionate" fees. See, e.g., Klonoff

Herrmann, supra note 201, at 1711-12 ("[T]he focus on coupon settlements ignores the many other
kinds of settlements that potentially result in 'disproportionate' awards to attorneys... . [C]oupon

settlements constitute only a small fraction of all class settlements . . . ."); Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S.
Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 132-34 (1997)
(finding that coupons were the predominant form of relief in only 10 percent of the class action
settlements studied in the mid-1990s).

203.

In re HP Inkjet Printer, 716 F.3d at 1178.
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perceived abuses of the class action device," 204 Congress enacted the Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"),205 which regulates coupon settlements in
two principal ways. 206 First, § 1712 regulates awards of attorneys' fees in
coupon class actions. Most relevant for our purposes is § 1712(a), which
provides that when a class action settlement awards coupons to the class,
"the portion of any attorney's fee award to class counsel that is attributable
to the award of the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of
the coupons that are redeemed." 207 In other words, class counsel's fee must
be based on the fraction of the coupons that are redeemed, rather than on
the total face value of the coupons that are awarded.20 8 This provision was
intended "to put an end to the 'inequities' that arise when class counsel
receive attorneys' fees that are grossly disproportionate to the actual value
204.
205.
amended
; 206.

Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-15, 1332(d), 1453 (2012)).
See Klonoff & Herrmann, supra note 201, at 1698-1705 (describing and critiquing CAFA's

efforts to regulate coupon settlements). In addition to regulating coupon settlements and other unfair

aspects of class action settlements, CAFA enlarged both original federal subject matter jurisdiction and
removal jurisdiction to shunt more class actions into federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453. See
also S. REP. No. 109-14, at 28-29, 35-50 (2005).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a).
208. Id. Section 1712(b)(1) provides that "[i]f a proposed settlement in a class action provides for
a recovery of coupons to class members, and a portion of the recovery of the coupons is not used to
determine the attorney's fee to be paid to class counsel, any attorney's fee award shall be based upon

the amount of time class counsel reasonably expended working on the action. " Id. § 1712(b)(1). There
is some doubt about the scope of subsection (b), its relationship with subsection (a), and whether the
two subsections, read together, permit a court to use a lodestar method to award attorneys' fees for
negotiating a coupon settlement. Compare In re HP Inkjet Printer, 716 F.3d at 1181-87 (concluding
&

that lodestar fees may not be awarded for the coupon portion of the class recovery) and Mallow

Kiser, supra note 201, at 1126 ("When coupons provide the sole basis for relief to the class, CAFA
requires the attorneys' fees award to 'be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are

redeemed."' (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a))), with Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 507 F. App'x 1, 45 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Even assuming that the coupon provisions of CAFA were applicable, the district
court's approval of the proposed settlement and the attorneys' fee award was appropriate. . . . The
district court approved the fee award after determining it was reasonable under the lodestar

method . .. and is therefore consistent with CAFA."), In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., No. II C 8176,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143146, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (concluding that "the statute allows for
&

the calculation of fees in a coupon settlement using the lodestar-multiplier method"), and Beisner

Miller, supra note 195, at 413 ("[T]he law does not require that fees in coupon settlements be structured
as contingency fees. Rather, the fees can be based upon the amount of time class counsel reasonably

expended working on the action.").
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of the coupon relief obtained for the class." 209 As the Report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee on CAFA put it, Congress intended to link class
counsel's fees to the "demonstrated value of coupons actually redeemed by
the class members." 210
Second, § 1712(e) requires greater judicial scrutiny of coupon
settlements. 21 1 In addition to reiterating that district courts must scrutinize
coupon settlements to ensure that they are "fair, reasonable and
adequate," 2 12 subsection (e) specifically regulates the use of cy pres to
distribute unclaimed coupons:
The court, in its discretion, may also require that a proposed settlement
agreement provide for the distribution of a portion of the value of
unclaimed coupons to I or more charitable or governmental
organizations, as agreed to by the parties. The distribution and
209.

In re HP Inkjet Printer, 716 F.3d at 1179 (citing S. REP. No. 109-14, at 29-32 (2005)). In

cases in which "a coupon settlement also provides for non-coupon relief, such as equitable or injunctive
relief," id. at 1183, the court should apply the lodestar method to calculate the attorneys' fees earned fr

non-coupon relief obtained. Id. at 1183-85 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)). See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1712(c) (governing attorneys' fees in cases in which a class action settlement provides for both
coupon and equitable relief); S. REP. No. 109-14, at 31 (2005) (stating that a portion of the fees should
be determined by "time spent by class counsel" if some of the relief is equitable or injunctive).
210. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 30 (2005).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e). See also In re HP Inkjet Printer, 716 F.3d at 1178 ("Section 1712
codifies Congress's effort to regulate coupon settlements. That regulation takes two forms. The first
invites increased judicial scrutiny of coupon settlements generally." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e))).
212. CompareFED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(2) ("If the proposal would bind class members, the court may
approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate."), with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1712(e) ("In a proposed settlement under which class members would be awarded coupons, the court
may approve the proposed settlement only after a hearing to determine whether, and making a written

finding that, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members."). Although the
language of § 1712(e) mirrors Rule 23(e)(2), some courts have read § 1712(e) to impose a heightened
level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 654 (7th
Cir. 2006) (stating in dicta that "Congress required heightened judicial scrutiny of coupon-based
settlements" in CAFA); True v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
("[S]everal courts have interpreted section 1712(e) as imposing a heightened level of scrutiny in
reviewing such [coupon] settlements."); Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1321

(S.D. Fla. 2007) (interpreting CAFA "to imply the application of a greater level of scrutiny to the
existing criteria than existed pre-CAFA"). But see Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37,
55 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that "the judicial scrutiny called for by § 1712(e) is indistinct from the
scrutiny required by Rule 23(e)").
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redemption of any proceeds under this subsection shall not be used to
calculate attorneys'fees under this section.213
Thus, while ensuring that unclaimed coupons do not go to waste (by
permitting cy pres distributions to charities), subsection (e) clarifies that
class counsel cannot receive attorneys' fees based upon the portion of the
coupons that are distributed in this way. 21 4
To ensure that class counsel has a strong incentive to negotiate a
settlement that directly benefits the class and to discourage the use of cy
pres distributions, I propose that courts presumptively reduce attorneys'
fees in cases in which all or a portion of the settlement fund is distributed
cy pres. Courts using a percentage of recovery method to calculate
attorneys' fees could reduce attorneys' fees in a number of ways. Drawing
upon the CAFA model, courts could calculate attorneys' fees as a
percentage of only those settlement funds actually claimed by class
members, and decline to award fees on the portion of the fund distributed
to charities cy pres. 2 15 This "no fee" approach, which would deny class
213.

28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (emphasis added).

214.

Taking a similar tack, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act provides that "[t]otal

attorneys' fees and expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class [in private securities
class actions] shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment

interest actually paid to the class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2012) (emphasis added). See also HR.
REP. No. 104-369, at 36 (1995) (seeking to limit "the award of attorney's fees and costs to counsel for a
class ...

to a reasonable percentage of the amount of recovery awarded to the class" and intending "to

give the court flexibility in determining what is reasonable on a case-by-case basis"). But see Masters v.

Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 437-38 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[T]he entire fund created by
the efforts of counsel presumably is 'paid to the class,' even if some of the funds are distributed under
the Cy Pres Doctrine.").
At least one state law regulating coupon settlements imposes even greater limits on the fees
recoverable by class counsel. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 26.003(b) (West 2008) ("[Tf
any portion of the benefits recovered for the class are in the form of coupons or other noncash common
benefits, the attorney's fees awarded in the action must be in cash and noncash amounts in the same
proportion as the recovery for the class.").
215.
the

See Tidmarsh, supra note

percentage

members[,] . .

is

calculated,

I1,

at 788 ("[I]n calculating the amount of the recovery on vhich

a court

must

include

only

the

amount

distributed

to class

use the net recovery to the class, rather than the gross recovery, as the fund of which

counsel may receive a percentage[, and] . . . subtract[] . . . the costs of litigation-including the costs of
delivering the remedy to individual class members" (footnotes omitted)); Beisner, Miller & Schwartz,
supra note 73, at 19 ("[W]henever a settlement agreement includes a cy pres component, the fees
awarded to class counsel should be tied to the value of money and benefits actually redeemed by the
injured class members-not the theoretical value of the cy pres remedy.").
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counsel any fee on the portion of the fund distributed cy pres, would align
the interests of the class and its counsel by giving class counsel a very
strong incentive to maximize the amount of money put into class members'
hands. The disadvantage of the "no fee" approach is that it would reduce
fees even for attorneys who work aggressively and valiantly to maximize
class recovery. 216 Moreover, the "no fee" approach could discourage the
filing of class actions in which cy pres relief would be the only viable (or
principal) method for distributing the settlement fund. While some might
welcome that result, 2 17 others might bemoan the loss of deterrence and
disgorgement that class actions can achieve even when they fail to
compensate absent class members for their losses. 21 8
As an alternative to the CAFA "no fee" approach, courts could award
class counsel a lower percentage of the portion of the settlement fund
distributed cy pres. 2 19 Like the "no fee" approach, this "reduced fee"
approach would give class counsel a financial incentive to maximize the
portion of the settlement fund distributed directly to class members since
counsel would receive a larger percentage of those funds actually paid to
216.

See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2013) ("There are a variety

of reasons that settlement funds may remain even after an exhaustive claims process-including if the
class members' individual damages are simply too small to motivate them to submit claims. Class
counsel should not be penalized for these or other legitimate reasons unrelated to the quality of
representation they provided.").

217.

See Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 9, at 665 (advocating a denial of class certification

in cases in which the court anticipates "significant unclaimed funds").

218. E.g., Klonoff & Herrmann, supra note 201, at 1704 (questioning the sentence in section
1712(e) of CAFA that denies attorneys' fees on the portion of a coupon settlement that is distributed to
charities cy pres, and expressing concern that "certain socially beneficial class action lawsuits will not

be filed and misconduct will go undeterred"). Cf In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 178 (disclaiming an
interest in "discourag[ing] counsel from filing class actions in cases where few claims are likely to be
made but the deterrent effect of the class action is equally valuable").

219.

The ALI Principles appear to take this "reduced fee" approach. While the black letter rule

provides that "[a]ttomeys' fees in class actions . . . should be based on both the actual value of the
judgment or settlement to the class and the value of cy pres awards," ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 11,

§ 3.13(a)

(emphasis added), the comment adds that "because cy pres payments ...

only indirectly

benefit the class, the court need not give such payments the same full value for purposes of setting

attorneys' fees as would be given to direct recoveries by the class." Id. § 3.13(a) cmt. a. See also, e.g.,
In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1077 (S.D.
Tex. 2012) ("Discounting the amount of the cy pres payment in determining its value to the class is
consistent with the nature of the indirect benefit cy pres provides to the class. . . .[D]iscounting the [cy
pres] payment by 50% best values the benefit conferred on the class." (footnote omitted)).
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the class and a smaller percentage of the remaining funds distributed cy
pres. Arguably, the incentive to maximize payments to class members
provided by the "reduced fee" approach would not be as great as the
incentive provided by the "no fee" approach because under the former,
class counsel would receive a fee, albeit a reduced one, even on the portion
of the fund distributed to charity. On the other hand, class counsel would
not be as discouraged from filing class actions that could achieve
deterrence and disgorgement even if they could not ensure compensation to
the absent class members. 2 2 0
Courts employing the lodestar method should also seek to align the
interests of the class and its counsel by presumptively discounting
attorneys' fees whenever all or a portion of the settlement fund is
distributed cy pres. To do so, courts employing the lodestar method should
presumptively apply a "negative multiplier" whenever a portion of the
settlement fund is distributed cy pres to charity. 221 In other words, after
determining the number of hours reasonably spent representing the class
and multiplying that number by a reasonable hourly rate, the court would
reduce the total, by multiplying it by a number less than one, in light of
counsel's failure to ensure that the entire settlement fund was distributed to
class members. The size of the negative multiplier should reflect, among
other things, the portion of the fund distributed cy pres.
Like the "no fee" and the "reduced fee" methods described above, the
"negative multiplier" method would reduce attorneys' fees in cases in
which class members did not claim the entire settlement fund. Professor
Tidmarsh's suggestion that "only hours spent working to generate
compensation for class members should count" 222 would achieve the same
result. I prefer the "negative multiplier" approach because it avoids the
difficult task of determining which attorney-hours actually resulted in
compensation for the class.
Regardless of whether the court applies a percentage of recovery
method, a lodestar method, one of these methods cross-checked by the
220.

See supra note 218.

See, e.g., Jones v. GN Netcom, Inc. (In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.), 654 F.3d
935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (using the term "negative multiplier" to refer to the number by which the
221.

lodestar figure would be multiplied to achieve a downward adjustment in attorneys' fees). I use the term

"negative multiplier" although I find it somewhat confusing; the lodestar figure is not multiplied by a
negative number, but rather by a fraction less than one.

222.

Tidmarsh, supranote 11, at 788.

144

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:97

other, or a hybrid approach,22 3 the court's default position should be to
discount attorneys' fees whenever all or a portion of the settlement fund is
distributed cy pres. With this presumptive rule in place, attorneys would
know from the outset that their fees likely would be reduced if they failed
to negotiate a settlement that put money into the hands of the class. Since
class counsel would have a personal financial incentive to put more money
into the hands of class members, their interests would be better aligned
with the interests of the class.
Courts could depart from the presumptive approach and award
undiscounted fees (or even fees increased by application of a "positive
multiplier") upon a showing that unclaimed funds remained
notwithstanding class counsel's best efforts to maximize class recovery.
Such a showing could be made in cases in which individual claimants
could not be identified through reasonable effort, individual payments were
not economically feasible, or where claims filed by absent class members
failed to exhaust the settlement fund notwithstanding genuine and vigorous
efforts by class counsel both to structure the settlement to maximize class
recovery and to inform the class of the opportunity to file a claim. 224 The
disclosures proposed below in Part VII.B should enable the court to make
this determination. In cases in which class counsel makes such a showing,
the court could consider the "quality of representation, the benefit obtained
for the class, the complexity and novelty of the issues presented, and the
risk of nonpayment"225 to support further adjustments to the multiplier or
the percentage of recovery. In sum, my proposal of a rebuttable
presumptive reduction in attorneys' fees is both less absolute than CAFA's
mandatory "no fee" approach and somewhat more stringent than the Third
Circuit's case-by-case discretionary approach,22 6 which lacks a default or
presumption in favor of discounted attorneys' fees.
223. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 196, at 546-66. See also Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 78788 (describing and proposing friendly amendments to Professor Clermont's proposal).
224. Accord Klonoff & Herrmann, supra note 201, at 1718-20 (proposing that attorneys' fees
should be awarded even on the portion of a settlement distributed cy pres in cases in which the class
would indirectly benefit and where "(1) . . . direct distribution to individual class members is not
economically feasible or (2) when funds remain after class members are given a full and fair
opportunity to make a claim").

225.
In re Bluetooth Headset Prods., 654 F.3d at 942 (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150
F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998)).
226. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[O]ur approach is case
by case, providing courts discretion to determine whether to decrease attorneys' fees where a portion of

a fund will be distributed cy pres.").
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Any proposal that ties attorneys' fees to the portion of the settlement
fund actually claimed by the class members runs the risk of delaying the
award of such fees. After all, if the court cannot calculate attorneys' fees
until it has determined how much of the fund has been claimed by absent
class members and how much has been distributed to charities cy pres, then
class counsel may have to wait until after this determination is made to
recover its fees. This problem is not insurmountable, however, and several
possible solutions exist.
First, and most obvious, the court could simply delay awarding
attorneys' fees until after the close of the claims period. Only then would it
know the actual amount of the settlement fund distributed to class members
and the amount distributed cy pres. In cases with short claims periods, such
a delay would not impose an undue hardship on class counsel and would
simplify the judicial task of approving a fee award.227
Second, courts could award fees based upon a good faith projection of
the portion of the fund to be claimed by class members (based upon either
expert testimony228 or past experience in a similar case22 ), subject to later
adjustment upon the close of the claims period.23 0 Counsel could be
required to post a bond to ensure reimbursement of any overpayment once
the final fees are calculated and approved. Since class members are often
afforded the opportunity to submit claim forms following provisional
certification of the class and before final approval of the settlement,23 1 there
227. See, e.g., In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d
184, 190 (D. Me. 2003) (delaying award of attorneys' fees and commenting that a six-month claims
period "is not an inordinately long extension").
228. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1712(d) (2012) ("[T]he court may .. . receive expert testimony ... on
the actual value to the class members of the coupons that are redeemed."); In re Compact Disc
Minimum Advertised Price, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 187-88 & nn.5-6 (discussing an expert economist's
calculation of the anticipated redemption rate for a voucher); Mallow & Kiser, supra note 201, at 1127
("Plaintiffs' counsel sometimes use expert testimony to try to establish the 'redemption value' of the
coupons in order to provide courts with evidence to support their requested fee award.").

229.
Cf Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 989 F. Supp. 375, 378 (D. Mass. 1997)
(concluding that it would be improper to "project a value for the settlement by comparing this
settlement to similar ones" because the other settlements were "different enough from the present one
that they [did] not provide a reliable indication of what the actual value of the settlement [would] be in
this case").
230.

See Klonoff & Herrmann, supra note 201, at 1701-02 ("[C]ourts could allow class counsel to

receive fees based on projected redemption rates subject to later adjustment once actual redemptions

can be counted.").
231. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 175 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that the
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might even be good data upon which to base such a projection.
Third, the court could award attorneys' fees in periodic installments,
based upon actual claims submitted by class members over time, with a
final adjustment at the conclusion of the claims period.23 2 Such an approach
would give class counsel a strong ongoing incentive to identify and
encourage prospective claimants to file claims against the settlement
fund.2 33
A court could combine the last two approaches by making an initial
provisional award of attorneys' fees based upon a projection or estimate of
the claims to be made by class members; ordering an immediate payment
of a portion of such fees; and, at the close of the claims period, ordering a
final payment of the balance of fees owed to class counsel, adjusted to take
into account the amount paid directly to class members and the scope of the
cy pres distribution. 234
In sum, regardless of the method by which they ordinarily calculate
attorneys' fees in class action litigation, courts should presumptively
reduce such fees whenever a portion or all of the settlement funds are
distributed cy pres. Such a fee structure would better align the interests of
class counsel and the represented class, thereby creating incentives for class
counsel to negotiate settlements that maximize recovery by the class. This
claims period had expired before the district court approved the settlement); Mallow & Kiser, supra
note 201, at 1127 ("[T]he settlement agreement nearly always allows settlement class members to

'claim in' prior to final approval (i.e., file a claim for benefits) so the number of settlement class
members requesting coupons in advance of final approval will be known to the court.").
232. See Klonoff & Herrmann, supra note 201, at 1702 (positing that attorneys' fees could "be
paid on a periodic installment basis depending on the value of coupons received during the installment
period" (citing Duhaime, 989 F. Supp. at 379)).
233. See, e.g., Duhaime, 989 F. Supp. at 380 ("Staging the fee award ... will reinforce class
counsel's continuing incentive to monitor the ADR process vigorously ....
234.

).

Courts have taken such an approach in other contexts in which the value of the settlement

could not be determined at the time class counsel submitted its application for attorneys' fees. See, e.g.,

id. at 379 ("The solution is to approve the fee requested provisionally, permit its partial payment
immediately, but reserve the balance for payment either in full or after any appropriate adjustment in

the light of actual experience under the settlement."); Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1261, 1284
(S.D. Ohio 1996) (ordering an immediate payment to counsel of 10 percent of the amounts paid by
defendant into the common fund to date; anticipating applications on an annual basis for up to 10
percent of the amount to be paid by defendant into the settlement fund in future years). See also FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(h) advisory committee's note (2003) ("In some cases, it may be appropriate to defer some
portion of the fee award until actual payouts to class members are known.").
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presumption of reduced fees could be overcome if class counsel
demonstrated that individual claimants could not be identified through
reasonable effort, direct payments to class members were not economically
feasible, or settlement funds remained notwithstanding vigorous and
genuine efforts by class counsel to maximize recovery by members of the
class.

B. DISCLOSURE STATEMENT REGARDING EFFORTS TO MAXIMIZE CLASS
RECOVERY AND TAILOR CY PRES REMEDY

Just as a presumptive reduction in attorneys' fees should deter overreliance on cy pres distributions, required disclosures should facilitate
monitoring, enable better-informed decisionmaking, and maximize the
portion of a settlement fund that is paid to individual class members.
Mandatory disclosures are common in the law, as evidenced by, for
example, the National Environmental Policy Act's required environmental
impact statements 235 and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act's mandated
disclosures regarding proposed new drugs.2 36
Once a class action settlement is negotiated and presented to the court
for its approval, several different players have occasion to review it. The
court has to assess the proposed settlement's fairness, reasonableness, and
adequacy; 2 37 absent class members have to decide whether to accept the
settlement or to opt out;2 38 and potential objectors often have to decide
whether or not to oppose it. 239 Unfortunately, these players typically lack
the information they need to make these decisions. 240 After all, none of
235.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012) (requiring that all federal agencies proposing legislation or
"other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" prepare a
"detailed statement" on "the environmental impact," "any adverse environmental effects," "alternatives
to the proposed action," "the relationship between local short-term uses. . . and... long-term
productivity, and . . any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources").
236.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (requiring disclosure of investigations of a proposed drug's
safety and efficacy; its components; "a full description of... the manufacture, processing, and packing
of such drug"; and proposed labels, among other things).
237. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
238.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4).
239. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5).
240. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
787, 789 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing the reasons why the trial judge in a settlement class action lacks the
information needed to monitor for collusion and other abuses); Klement, supra note 115, at 45-52
(describing the informational deficiencies suffered by courts and absent class members); Lahav, supra
note 196, at 118 ("[T]he lack of information available to class members, and especially objectors and
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them participated in the settlement negotiations, and none had the ability or
incentive to monitor the attorneys who were involved.24 1 Moreover, once
class counsel and defense counsel reach a settlement, it is in their mutual
self-interest to secure judicial approval, objectors' silence, and class
members' buy-in; neither side has an interest in identifying the
inadequacies of the settlement. 242 These informational deficiencies make it
difficult for the interested parties to determine whether class counsel has
done its best to maximize direct payments to the class and to gauge the
need for, and appropriateness of, a cy pres distribution.
To ameliorate these informational deficiencies, I recommend that class
counsel be required to make certain disclosures at the time she seeks
approval of a class action settlement that contemplates a cy pres
distribution. First, class counsel should provide (1) its best estimate of the
judges, limits the ability of these important actors to challenge the existing governance structure.").
241. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primeron Reform, 62
IND. L.J. 625, 652 (1987) (noting that in negative-value class actions, "no individual plaintiff probably
has the ability or incentive to monitor [class counsel's] performance"); Klement, supra note 115, at 47
("[C]ourts often find it almost impossible to monitor attorneys in common fund class actions.");
Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1203 (1982) (noting that
even the named class representatives "generally are neither highly motivated nor well situated to
monitor the congruence between counsel's conduct and class preferences"); Wasserman, supra note
113, at 482 ("Without sufficient investment in the litigation, it is unlikely that class members will
monitor class counsel . . . .").
242. See, e.g., Klement, supra note 115, at 50 n.66 ("[T]he settling defendant and class
attorney ... obviously have no interest in meaningful inquiries."); Lahav, supra note 196, at 80 (noting
that fairness hearings are usually non-adversarial because "both parties' attorneys want approval of the
settlement they have worked hard to formulate"); John Leubsdorf, Statement at the Public Hearing on
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Nov. 22, 1996), in 4 WORKING PAPERS
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, 1, 9,
(1997)
[hereinafter
Leubsdorf Statement],
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/

RulesAndPolicies/rules/WorkingPapers-Vol4.pdf (noting that the defendant and class counsel "unite in
arguing [the merits of the settlement] to the court, which hence has no source of contrary information
and advocacy");

William B. Rubenstein,

The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory

Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1445 (2006) ("Because counsel for the plaintiff class and the
defendant share an interest in obtaining court approval of the settlement, judges are unlikely to receive
information that could be relevant to the fairness of the settlement from the parties themselves.");
Wasserman, supra note 113, at 475-76 (noting that class counsel's "strong self-interest in gaining
judicial approval of the settlement" may outweigh her interest in "providing full and fair disclosure of
the settlement terms"); Wolfman, supra note 113, at 86-87 (stating that once settlement is reached, "the
named parties are non-adverse, and judges do not have their lawyers' help in ferreting out the case's
strengths and weaknesses as they do in other cases").
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number of prospective claimants; (2) the basis for, and data underlying, that
estimate; (3) the total amount of money the defendant has agreed to pay the
class; (4) the amount an individual claimant may receive (by category if
different amounts are available to class members in different
circumstances); and (5) the estimated costs of processing individual claims
and making individual payments. These disclosures are designed to assess
the viability of individual payments and the corresponding need, if any, for
a cy pres distribution. 243
Second, class counsel should identify all "reasonable effort[s]," 24
whether made independently or in conjunction with the defendant 2 45 or
others, 246 to identify and notify the absent class members. If individual
notice was already provided to the absentees, class counsel should disclose
(1) the means employed to identify them; (2) the number of notices mailed
and the method of mailing employed; 24 7 (3) efforts to reach the estates of
class members who had died; 248 (4) the number of notices returned as
undeliverable; and (5) the steps taken, if any, to notify those class members
whose notices were returned.2 49 In all events, class counsel should disclose
243. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, § 3.07(a) (barring cy pres distributions where class members
are readily identifiable and have claims large enough to make individual distributions economically
viable).
244. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring "the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort" (emphasis added)). See also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, § 3.07(a) (describing the criteria to
determine when a cy pres award is appropriate); 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 26, § 8:8 (discussing the
"reasonable effort" requirement).
(1978)
U.S. 340, 355
v. Sanders, 437
245. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc.
a
defendant's
("Rule 23(d) . . . authorizes a district court in appropriate circumstances to require
cooperation in identifying the class members to whom notice must be sent.").
246. Class counsel typically retains a for-profit company to provide notice to the class.
3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 26, § 8:1, at 238-39, § 8:27, at 310 (describing the use of for-profit notice
companies).
247. Class counsel may choose from different methods of mailing. Id. § 8:28, at 310 ("[F]irst class
mail is ideal for sending individual notice to class members."); id. at 310-12 (discussing bulk mail and
postcard options).
248. See, e.g., Childs v. United Life Ins. Co., No. 10-CV-23-PJC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70113,
at *15-16 (N.D. Okla. May 21, 2012) (concluding that the "manner of informing heirs of deceased
Class Members is inadequate").
249. See, e.g., Rannis v. Recchia, 380 F. App'x 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that "skip
trace searches on each member whose notice was returned as undeliverable in an effort to locate better
addresses" demonstrated a reasonable effort); Childs, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70113 at *7 (describing
efforts to re-mail notices where forwarding addresses were available or where an "address search firm"
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the private company, if any, retained to provide notice to the class,2 50 and
describe the actions taken other than, or in addition to, notice by mail to
provide notice to the class, including newspaper, television or radio
advertisements, Internet notice, posted notices in the workplace, and the
like. 25 1 These disclosures are designed to ensure that class counsel attempts
to notify as many class members as reasonably possible so as to maximize
the portion of the settlement fund distributed directly to individual class
members.2 52 If the court previously approved the notice plan,2 53 class
counsel seeking final approval of a settlement with a cy pres component
would have to disclose only new information not previously provided to the
court.
Third, class counsel should describe the steps taken, or proposed to be
taken, to maximize the number of absent class members who actually
submit claims for payment from the settlement fund. In this regard, counsel
should describe efforts to reduce hurdles that may inhibit participation,
such as a requirement for receipts or other records that prospective
claimants might lack. In particular, class counsel should identify less
demanding evidentiary requirements for making claims that were
considered, if any, and why they were rejected.254 This disclosure
located new addresses).
250.

See supra note 246.

251. 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 26, §§ 8:29, 8:30 (describing notice by publication and notice by
broadcast and Internet).
252. See supra notes 19-27, 33 and accompanying text (explaining how settlement funds often go
unclaimed due to the difficulty of providing notice to potential class members whose identities are
unknown).

253. Certification notice is mandatory in Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions, FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B), and notices of a proposed settlement and a petition for attorneys' fees are also mandatory.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1), 23(h)(1). Often a "single notice encompasses notice of certification,
settlement, and fees." 3 RUBENSTEIN, supranote 26, § 8:1, at 238. Before notice is provided, the parties
must present a notice plan to the court for its approval. See, e.g., In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales

Practices Litig., 279 F.R.D. 598, 617-18 (D. Kan. 2012) (reviewing the parties' notice plan, describing
the notice hearing at which the parties' notice experts testified, and approving the plan); Childs, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70113, at *9-14 (following judicial approval of a joint notice plan, holding that the
notice actually provided was inadequate because the settlement administrator relied upon bulk mail,
rather than direct mail to each individual class member); 3 RUBENSTEIN, supranote 26, § 8:36, at 341-

42 (describing the court's evaluation of notice plans).
254. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2013) (positing that
"many class members did not submit claims because they lacked the documentary proof necessary" and
questioning whether "a settlement with such a restrictive claims process was in the best interest of the
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requirement is designed to increase the participation rate by eliminating
unnecessary hurdles that might inhibit participation.
Fourth, class counsel should describe the follow-up steps taken, or
proposed to be taken, to maximize payments to individual class members in
the event that funds remain following the conclusion of the claims period.
In particular, counsel should describe the steps taken or proposed to be
taken, if any, to reach prospective class members who did not or have not
yet filed claims, 255 and to provide further distributions to class members
who already have filed claims. If class counsel does not propose to engage
in additional outreach efforts or to make further distributions to current
claimants, it should explain its reasons for declining to take these steps. 256
Finally, class counsel should identify the charity or charities to which
it proposes to donate the unclaimed or non-distributable funds; report on
the charity's record of service; 25 7 explain how the charity's interests align
with those of the class; 258 and explain whether the geographical area the
class"); id. at 175 ("The parties may wish to ...

lower[] the evidentiary bar for receiving a higher

award."). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Angeion Group, LLC in Support of Petition for Rehearing or

Rehearing En Banc at 4-8, Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621 (3d Cir. Oct. 4, 2013), 2013 WL
5606438 (describing the sophisticated fraud-prevention screening methods, programmatic audits, and
other tools employed by claims administrators to screen out fraud in cases in which proof of purchase is
not required); Francis E. McGovern, Distribution ofFunds in Class Actions-Claims Administration, 35
J. CORP. L. 123, 125, 134 (2009) (recommending "more user friendly forms to reduce the burden of
participation").

255.

See, e.g., SEC v. Bear, Steams & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y.

2009)

(describing the fund administrator's renewed and innovative outreach efforts to reach investors who had

not submitted claim forms and noting that the 47 percent response rate in "phase II" was "remarkable"
because it represented submissions from people who had not responded in phase I and actually
exceeded the response rate achieved in phase I).
256. See, e.g., Rohn v. Tap Pharm. Prods. (In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.), 677 F.3d
21, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2012) ("The district court appropriately decided that a supplemental consumer
claims process would be prohibitively expensive, time-consuming, and, given the high mortality rate
among members of the class, would likely recruit few new claimants."). See also supra notes 67-71 and
accompanying text (explaining situations in which courts have determined that additional outreach
efforts and further distributions are not necessary).

257.

See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 834 (9th Cir. 2012) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)

(expressing concern that the cy pres distribution "goes to a new entity with no past performance at all"),

cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (mem.); Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus
Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a cy pres distribution because the proposed
recipient "is not an organization with a substantial record of service").
258.

See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 11,

§ 3.07(c)

("The court, when feasible, should require the
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charity serves coincides with the area in which the class members reside or
work or where the events giving rise to the claim occurred.25 9 Such
disclosures are designed to ensure that if the entire settlement fund cannot
be distributed to class members, at least it is donated to a charity with a
proven record of serving their interests. Moreover, requiring the parties to
propose potential cy pres recipients should reduce the judge's discretion to
steer the remainder to a favored charity. 260
Requiring class counsel to disclose the extent of their efforts to
maximize direct payments to individual class members and to tailor cy pres
distributions to serve the class's best interests should not only facilitate
monitoring by the court, the class, and potential objectors, but should also
prompt class counsel to monitor themselves. As Professor Alexandra Lahav
has written,
Class counsel may behave differently when the prospect of transparency
looms over them, and thus results may be improved ex ante. ... [T]he
sanitizing effect of mandatory disclosure may work from the inside as
well as out-not just catching irresponsible behavior but encouraging
better behavior to make disclosure less painful.261

To address potential concerns regarding duplicative disclosures,
timing, and cost, I offer several refinements to my proposal. Just as courts
should delay final awards of attorneys' fees until they have data on the
distribution of the settlement fund,262 I suggest that they should delay final
approval of class action settlements, or at least the cy pres portion of such
parties to identify a recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the
class."). See also supra Part V.A (explaining that cy pres distributions can be problematic when they are
not well-tailored to serve the interest of the class).
259. See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that
approval of the cy pres distribution was an abuse of discretion in part because the class included persons
throughout the United States, whereas two-thirds of the proposed donations would have been made to
local charities in Los Angeles). See also supra note 95 (citing cases in which the cy pres distribution did
not match the geographical location of the class members).
260. See Yospe, supra note 42, at 104, 1055-56 (proposing that "[Il]imiting the judicial role from a
position of absolute discretion to that of an arbiter would reduce the judicial bias problem" and strongly
encouraging the parties to propose potential cy pres recipients in the settlement agreement); Beisner,
Miller & Schwartz, supra note 73, at 20 (proposing that the parties, rather than the judge, should
determine the cy pres recipients to "minimize the risk that judges will use their influence to steer cy
pres funds to their preferred charities").
261. Lahav, supra note 196, at 121 (footnote omitted).
262. See supra notes 227-234 and accompanying text (proposing several means by which
attorneys' fees could be calculated after class members were paid from the settlement fund).
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settlements, 263 until they receive the disclosures described above detailing
the amount of the recovery that has been or will be paid to the class and
efforts made to maximize that amount and to reduce reliance on cy pres
distributions. 264 If claimants can submit their claim forms upon the
provisional approval of the settlement, 2 65 then the court can hold the
fairness hearing and consider final approval of the settlement after the
claims period closes and class counsel has made the requisite disclosures.
This timing would be optimal because it would permit the court to review
disclosures regarding the extent of the direct benefit to the class before it
decides whether to finally approve the settlement. 2 66
If, for some reason, class members cannot submit claim forms until
after the settlement is finally approved, then the court may approve the
settlement upon receipt of the disclosures that counsel was able to submit
in advance of the fairness hearing; but it should withhold final
consideration of the cy pres portion of the settlement until the close of the
claims period and upon receipt of class counsel's final disclosures. 267
In no event should class counsel have to submit identical information
more than once. Thus, if class counsel has already provided the court with
some of the required information, it would disclose only "new" information
when it seeks final approval of the settlement or the cy pres portion thereof.
For example, if the court already approved the notice plan, then in
connection with its motion seeking final approval of the settlement, class
counsel would not re-disclose its plan for broadcast and Internet notice, but
it would disclose the number of notices that could not be delivered, the
263. E.g., Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 65 (D.D.C. 2010) ("Because the
Court has concerns about the distribution of proceeds from the proposed cy pres fund, the Court shall
HOLD IN ABEYANCE approval of the Class Settlement Scholarship Fund and revisit that issue after
the class members have submitted their claims for vouchers and the amount of money to be deposited
into the CSSF is determined."); Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212,
220 (D.D.C. 2007) ("hold[ing] in abeyance Class Plaintiffs Motion to Distribute, insofar as it seeks
approval of a cy pres distribution to the Endowment Fund, and . . . order[ing] Class Plaintiff to provide
further briefing as to the appropriateness of its proposed cy pres recipient").
264.

See Lahav, supra note 196, at 119 ("The most important way that mandatory disclosure

reduces agency costs is by enabling informational intermediaries to monitor class counsel.").
265.

See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing the opportunity to file claim forms

upon provisional approval of the settlement).

266.

See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 175 (3d Cir. 2013) (vacating the

district court order approving the settlement because "it did not know the amount of compensation that
will be distributed directly to the class").

267.

Supra note 263-264 and accompanying text.
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number of forwarding addresses identified and employed, and other steps
taken to notify those class members whose notices were returned as
undeliverable.
Even if made only once, the disclosures proposed here would impose
significant costs on the attorneys who would have to prepare them and on
the judges who would have to review them. 268 The attorneys' costs likely
would be paid from the settlement fund (or by the defendant, which would
reduce the size of the settlement fund to cover these costs). If the
disclosures ultimately result in larger and more direct payments to
individual class members and fewer cy pres distributions, then imposition
of the costs will be worth it.269 As to the judicial costs, if courts continue to
entertain proposals for cy pres distributions, they should at least be willing
to experiment with disclosures that could reduce over-reliance on such
distributions and increase their efficacy.

C. APPOINTMENT OF AN OBJECTOR OR A DEVIL'S ADVOCATE TO OPPOSE
THE CY PRES DISTRIBUTION

While the disclosures proposed above should provide absent class
members, prospective objectors, and the court with the types of information
needed to monitor class counsel and to assess the settlement and its cy pres
provisions, agency costs remain. The court in an adversarial system is
passive and depends upon the parties to present it with information, 270 but
the lawyers who negotiate the settlement have no interest in disclosing any
information that would call into question the settlement's adequacy or the
cy pres remedy's appropriateness. 27 1 Class members, who have little at
stake, lack both the incentive and resources to monitor. 27 2 Thus,
268.

Lahav, supra note 196, at 121 ("[D]isclosure requirements create additional monitoring costs

for courts as well as costs for class counsel who must compile materials.").

269.

Id. ("Whether disclosure rules will in fact produce social gains in excess of their cost is a

matter for empirical study."). If the cost of the disclosures were to exceed the increase in the amount
paid directly to class members, this particular proposal would need to be revisited.
270.

See, e.g., Klement, supra note 115, at 45 (noting the "institutional requirements of neutrality

and passivity set by the adversary system"); Macey & Miller, supra note 192, at 66 (noting judicial
passivity); Wasserman, supranote 113, at 479 (same).
271.

See supra notes 189-190, 240-241 and accompanying text. See also Wasserman, supra note

113, at 479-80 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997); Kamilewicz v. Bank
of Bos. Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting that the parties
"may even put one over on the court, in a staged performance")).

272.

See supra notes 240-248 and accompanying text.
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"informational intermediaries" are needed to monitor class counsel.273
Building upon suggestions by John Leubsdorf,274 William Rubenstein, 275
and others, 27 6 I recommend the appointment of an objector or a "devil's
advocate" to oppose class action settlements in general and cy pres
distributions in particular.
In proposing the appointment of an attorney to oppose class action
settlements, Leubsdorf was careful to distinguish such an objector from a
guardian ad litem. In his view, a guardian ad litem would "duplicate the
court's function by evaluating whether the settlement is desirable," whereas
an objector would be "instructed to bring to the court's attention all
relevant information and reasonable arguments supporting rejection of the
settlement." 277 Analogizing to individuals appointed by the Catholic
Church to oppose proposed canonizations or beatifications, Rubenstein,
too, has proposed appointment of a devil's advocate to make the best
arguments againsta class action settlement.2 78
Drawing upon these proposals, I recommend that following receipt of
the disclosures required in Part VII.B above and before conducting a
fairness hearing on a proposed class action settlement that contemplates a
cy pres distribution, the trial judge should appoint a devil's advocate to
oppose the cy pres remedy. 27 9 Specifically, the court should ask the devil's
273.

See Lahav, supra note 196, at 119 (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,

THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 292-93 (1991)).
274.

Leubsdorf Statement, supra note 242, at 9 (proposing that Rule 23 be amended to "require

courts to appoint a lawyer to challenge any proposed settlement in any class action in which the
estimated value of the relief (including attorney fees) exceeds $1,000,000").

275. Rubenstein, supra note 242, at 1453-56, 1475-77.
276. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak ofSettlement, 82 VA. L. REV.
1051, 1109 n.190 (1996) (advocating Leubsdorfs proposal); Lahav, supra note 196, at 128 ("[T]he
adversarial principle requires that the court appoint a third party to act as a 'devil's advocate' for the
class...."); Wasserman, supra note 113, at 529 (advocating the appointment of a "court-appointed
advocate" to "scrutinize the fairness and adequacy of the proposed settlement and make a report to the
court"). Cf Klement, supra note 115, at 50 n.66 (explaining the limited utility of guardians ad litem and
special masters appointed aler a class action settlement is reached); id. at 28-29, 61-80 (proposing an
auction system for the appointment of a monitor, who would select class counsel at the outset of the
litigation, determine counsel's fee, and monitor counsel's performance).
277.

Leubsdorf Statement, supra note 242, at 9 (emphasis added).

278.

Rubenstein, supra note 242, at 1453-54,1475-76.

279.

1 support the appointment of a devil's advocate to oppose the class action settlement in its

entirety, but I focus here on efforts to limit and tailor the use, and improve the efficacy, of cy pres
distributions.
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advocate to (1) identify weaknesses in class counsel's efforts to identify
and notify prospective class members; (2) identify obstacles that might (or
did) interfere with class members' ability or incentive to file claims, such
as unnecessarily challenging requirements for documentation; (3) identify
alternatives to a cy pres distribution that would put more money into the
hands of the class members, such as further payments to claimants until
they receive 100 percent of their losses (or possibly more, if treble damages
are available under the law); (4) explain why the proposed cy pres
distribution is not narrowly tailored to serve the best interests of the class or
the policy objectives of the laws underlying the class claims; (5) explain
why the proposed cy pres recipient is not an appropriate one; and
(6) oppose the fee petition submitted by class counsel. In addition, the court
should require class counsel and the defendant to post a bond to cover the
devil's advocate's fees and expenses to ensure that the advocate would be
compensated even if the settlement were ultimately disapproved by the
court. 280

Notwithstanding class counsel's affirmative obligation to make the
disclosures described in Part VII.B above, class counsel would have an
incentive to limit or shade these disclosures. 281 To combat this tendency,
the court should provide the devil's advocate with a reasonable opportunity
to take discovery to identify alternatives to, and weaknesses in, the cy pres
portion of the proposed settlement and the request for attorneys' fees. 282 if,
after reviewing class counsel's disclosures and taking discovery, the devil's
advocate were unable to identify a substantial weakness in or objection to
the proposed cy pres distribution or request for attorneys' fees, the
advocate could withdraw, as suggested by Rubenstein, after identifying any
280.
be ...

See Wasserman, supra note 113, at 529 ("Rule 23 and the state certification rules should

amended to require class counsel and the defendant ...

to post a bond to cover the costs of a

court-appointed advocate."). Cf Leubsdorf Statement, supra note 242, at 9 (proposing that the objector

be paid out of the recovery); Rubenstein, supra note 242, at 1453, 1455 (recommending that the devil's
advocate be paid from the settlement or with public funds); id. at 1456-59 (considering a bond
requirement that could be used to pay the attorneys' fees of objectors).
281.

See supra note 242 and accompanying text (describing class counsels' lack of motivation to

subject the settlement to scrutiny).
282.

Leubsdorf Statement, supra note 242, at 9 ("The objector would be entitled to obtain

reasonable

discovery

(recommending

concerning

that the class

the

settlement....");

advocate be

Wasserman,

supra note

provided with "reasonable

113, at 529

access to all relevant

information"). Cf Koniak & Cohen, supra note 276, at 1109 (noting the paltry discovery ordinarily
afforded to class action objectors); Lahav, supra note 196, at 85 (noting the "limits on objector

discovery").
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material that arguably counseled against the cy pres distribution or fee
award.283
If courts regularly appointed devil's advocates to oppose cy pres
distributions and took their objections seriously in gauging the fairness and
adequacy of class action settlements, presumably the class action bar would
begin to police itself and propose fewer and better cy pres remedies. 284
D. FINDINGS REQUIRED TO ENSURE RIGOROUS JUDICIAL REVIEW AND TO
LIMIT RELIANCE ON CY PRES DISTRIBUTIONS
Required disclosures by class counsel and appointments of devil's
advocates to oppose cy pres distributions should provide courts with the
information they need to rigorously assess proposals to distribute some or
all of the settlement fund to charities cy pres. But if courts are not
sufficiently motivated to carefully scrutinize settlement agreements to
ensure that they maximize payments to individual class members, then the
disclosures may be for naught. A risk of judicial ennui exists because
courts have incentives to clear their dockets-especially of time-consuming
class actions 285 -and may be predisposed to approve distributions to
charities with which they are affiliated or that serve their own
communities. 286 The challenge, then, is to ensure that courts rigorously
scrutinize cy pres distributions and approve their use only where direct
payments to individual class members are not feasible.
On the theory that trial courts will take their responsibilities especially
seriously when they are required to justify their conclusions in writing and
when they can expect scrupulous appellate review, I propose that trial
283. See Rubenstein, supra note 242, 1455-56 & n. 96 (discussing Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 744 (1967), which permits a court-appointed criminal defense attorney to withdraw if she finds the
client's case to be "wholly frivolous" and requires her to prepare a brief identifying "anything in the
record that might arguably support the appeal").
284. Id. at 1454 ("In a well-functioning system, the prospect of litigating against the devil's
advocate ought to create self-policing by class and defense attorneys, deterring both frivolous lawsuits
and sell outs."). See also supra text accompanying note 261.
285.

See, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Secret Class Action Settlements, 31 REV. LITIG. 889, 934-35

(2012) (noting that a court that "approves a class action settlement . .. is freed of the burden of
overseeing a large and potentially time-consuming case ...

[and] may also gain prestige as the court
&

that oversaw the settlement of a complex class action" (footnote omitted) (citing, inter alia, Koniak

Cohen, supra note 276, at 1122-23, 1127; Macey & Miller, supra note 192, at 45-46; Rubenstein,
supra note 242, at 1445; Wasserman, supra note 113, at 476 & n.73)).
286.

See supraPart V.D.
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courts be required to make findings on certain issues before approving cy
pres distributions. In particular, I propose that courts approve class action
settlements with cy pres features only upon finding that they satisfy the
requirements of section 3.07 of the ALI Principles. This section requires a
court to apply specific criteria in deciding whether to approve a cy pres
distribution in a given case. I incorporate the ALI criteria (with a few
modest adjustments) not only because they are eminently sensible, but also
because they have been vetted by a reputable and experienced group of
judges, practitioners, and academics and should be familiar to most judges.
My principal goals in requiring these findings are to ensure that trial courts
carefully scrutinize class action settlements, in light of the disclosures made
by class counsel and the objections proffered by devil's advocates, and that
appellate courts carefully review orders approving cy pres distributions, to
minimize reliance on cy pres remedies.
Just as required disclosures should facilitate self-monitoring by class
counsel,28 7 required findings by trial judges should promote greater
scrutiny of cy pres distributions. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require judges to make findings in other select contexts. Rule 52(a)(3)
recognizes that district courts may be required to "state findings or
conclusions when ruling on a motion," 288 and Rules 23 and 54 specifically
require district courts to make findings in connection with class action
settlements289 and awards of attorneys' fees. 290 The court's special
287. See supratext accompanying note 261.
288. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3). See also id advisory committee's note (2007) (noting that the rule
"reflects provisions in other rules that require Rule 52 findings," including Rules 23(e), 23(h) and
54(d)(2)(C)).
289. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(2) ("[T]he court may approve [a proposed class action settlement] only
after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate."). See also FED. R. Ctv. P.
23(e)(1)(B) advisory committee's note (2003) ("The court must make findings that support the
conclusion that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The findings must be set out in
sufficient detail to explain to class members and the appellate court the factors that bear on applying the

standard.").
290.

FED. R. Clv. P. 23(h)(3) (stating that a court entertaining a motion for attorneys' fees in a

certified class action "may hold a hearing and must find the facts and state its legal conclusions under
Rule 52(a)"); FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(C) (requiring that a court entertaining a motion for attorneys'
fees "must find the facts and state its conclusions of law as provided in Rule 52(a)"); FED. R. Civ. P.
54(d)(2)(C) advisory committee's note (1993) ("To facilitate review, the paragraph provides that the
court set forth its findings and conclusions as under Rule 52(a), though in most cases this explanation
could be quite brief."). See also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2012) (CAFA provision requiring written
finding of fairness of coupon settlements).
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responsibility and unique role in scrutinizing attorneys' fees 29 1 and class
action settlementS 292 not only justifies these existing Rules, but also the
proposed requirement that trial courts make findings in connection with cy
pres remedies.
In reviewing class action settlements, I recommend that trial courts
approve cy pres distributions only upon a finding that individual class
members are not identifiable through reasonable effort or their claims are
too small to make individual payments economically feasible. 293 In other
words, as required by section 3.07(a) of the ALI Principles, courts should
decline to approve cy pres distributions where direct payments to class
members are a viable option. 2 94
In cases in which individual payments to class members are made but
some funds remain unclaimed, courts should approve cy pres distributions
of the unclaimed funds only upon a finding that neither further outreach to
non-claiming class members 295 nor further distributions to participating
291.

See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h) advisory committee's note (2003) ("Active judicial

involvement in measuring fee awards is singularly important to the proper operation of the class-action
process.").

292.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) advisory committee's note (2003) ("[C]ourt review and approval are

essential to assure adequate representation of class members who have not participated in shaping the
settlement.").

293.

ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note I1, § 3.07(a). Cf In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d

163, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2013) (agreeing that "cy pres distributions are most appropriate where further

individual distributions are economically infeasible," but "declin[ing] to hold that cy pres distributions
are only appropriate in this context"; directing courts to consider "the degree of direct benefit provided

to the class"); Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 435-36 (2d Cir. 2007)
(vacating a district court order that had approved a cy pres distribution

where "neither side

contends . . . it would be onerous or impossible to locate class members or because each class member's
recovery would be so small as to make individual distribution economically impracticable"; concluding
that the district court had discretion to "allocate [unclaimed] funds to the members of the class as treble

damages"); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he reason for
appealing to cy pres is to prevent the defendant from walking away from the litigation scot-free because

of the infeasibility of distributing the proceeds of the settlement ....
294.

).

As the Comment to section 3.07 makes clear, the Principles "begin[] from the premise that

funds generated through the aggregate prosecution of divisible claims are presumptively the property of
the class members . ... Starting from this vantage point, this Section generally permits cy pres awards
only when direct distributions to class members are not feasible . . . ." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note I1,

§ 3.07 cmt. b.
295.

This specific proposal does not derive from section 3.07(b) of the ALI Principles. See supra

note 64 (describing additional outreach efforts to increase the number of class members who file claims
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class members would be economically viable or upon a finding that the
latter would be "impossible or unfair." 296 "[T]he settlement should
presumptively provide for further distributions to participating class
members," 297 as section 3.07(b) states, or for initial payments to class
members who have not previously submitted claim forms. A vague anxiety
over windfalls would not justify a finding of unfairness. 298
Where individual distributions are not viable, the courts should
approve cy pres distributions only upon a finding that the prospective
recipient's interests "reasonably approximate those being pursued by the
class." 299 This finding is required to ensure, whenever possible, a close
nexus between the class and the cy pres recipient. 300 In making this finding,
courts should consider, among other things, whether the prospective
recipient works to advance the policies underlying the laws invoked by the
class, 301 whether it has a proven track record of doing so, 302 and whether it
against the settlement fund).
296. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note I1, § 3.07(b). Accord Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658
F.3d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that a cy pres distribution is appropriate "only if it is not possible
to ... benefit[] the class members directly").
ALI PRINCIPLES, supranote 11, § 3.07(b).
Rejecting the argument that further distributions to claiming class members would constitute
a windfall, the Comment to section 3.07 explains that "few settlements award 100 percent of a class
member's losses, and thus it is unlikely in most cases that further distributions to class members would
result in more than 100 percent recovery for those class members." Id. § 3.07 cmt. b. Moreover, in most
cases, additional payments to claiming class members are more likely to serve the goals of the laws
underlying the class members' claims than would a cy pres distribution. Id. See also supra text
accompanying note 66 (maintaining that distributing more money to at least some of the class members
achieves the underlying objectives of compensation and deterrence).
297.
298.

299. ALI PRINCIPLES, supranote 11, § 3.07(c).
300. Id. § 3.07 cmt. b ("A cy pres award to a recipient whose interests closely approximate those
of the class is preferable" to reversion to the defendant or escheat to the state).
301. Some courts have approved cy pres distributions that do not meet this condition. See, e.g.,
Holtzman v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that the charity named in the district court
order "does not directly or indirectly benefit" the class); Fears v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., No.
02 Civ. 4911 (HB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48151 at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007) (in a class action
alleging price-fixing in the modeling industry, approving a cy pres distribution to charities providing
services of benefit to women in general, even though only a slim majority of the class members were
female and the charities did not purport to advance the policy objectives underlying the antitrust law),
vacated on other grounds, 315 F. App'x 333 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order); In re Motorsports Merch.

Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1395-99 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (in a class action alleging price-fixing
by vendors of NASCAR race souvenirs, approving a cy pres distribution to ten charities, including the
Make-a-Wish Foundation and the American Red Cross, which bore no discernible relationship to the
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serves the geographical area in which most or many of the claimants live or
work or where their claims arose. 303 If the court finds that no charity can be
identified that would meet the forgoing requirements, then and only then
may it approve a recipient "that does not reasonably approximate the
interests being pursued by the class." 304 In all events, courts should approve
cy pres distributions only upon a finding that none of the parties, their
attorneys or the court has "any significant prior affiliation" with a
prospective recipient that would "raise substantial questions" about the
integrity of the selection process. 305
E. IMPLEMENTATION

If these proposals are worthy of adoption, the final question is how
they should be implemented. The recommendations in Parts VII.B, C and
D, regarding disclosures, devil's advocates, and judicial findings could be
implemented by amendment of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Alternatively, trial courts could adopt these proposals on their
own, or, more likely, courts of appeals could require trial courts to follow
them. After all, the courts of appeals have developed the standards that
district courts now apply to review the fairness and adequacy of class
action settlements. 306 If and when the Supreme Court answers Chief Justice
absent class members or their claims).
302. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 834 (9th Cir. 2012) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern that the cy pres distribution "goes to a new entity with no past performance at all"),
cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (mem.); Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus
Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a cy pres distribution because the proposed
recipient "is not an organization with a substantial record of service").
303. See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that
approval of the cy pres distribution was an abuse of discretion in part because the class included persons
throughout the United States, whereas two-thirds of the proposed donations would have been made to
local charities in Los Angeles); Am. Soc'y of Travel Agents v. United Airlines, Inc. (In re Airline
Comm'n Antitrust Litig.), 268 F.3d 619, 626 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a cy pres distribution to "mostly
local recipients" when the class action was national in scope); Houck v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm.,

881 F.2d 494, 502 (7th Cir. 1989) (setting aside grants to two Chicago law schools and urging the
district court upon remand of a nationwide class action "to consider to some degree a broader
nationwide use of its cy pres discretion").
304.

ALI PRINCIPLES, supranote 11, § 3.07(c).

305.

Id § 3.07 cmt. b. See also supra notes 107-108, 119-120 and accompanying text (citing

cases in which the recipients of cy pres distributions had ties to the parties, their attorneys, or the

judges).
306.

See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 818-19 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the
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Roberts's call to scrutinize cy pres distributions, 307 the Court itself could
require lower courts to follow these recommendations.
The recommendation made in Part VII.A regarding a presumptive
reduction in attorneys' fees should be enacted by Congress, 308 as were the
provisions regulating attorneys' fees in CAFA and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act;3 09 but the likelihood of congressional action on this
issue (on any issue, it seems) is remote. It may be that, in the absence of
legislation, the courts could adopt this recommendation too, as they have
developed a significant body of case law governing attorneys' fees in class
action litigation, especially in "common fund" cases. 3 10
Hanlon factors guide the district court in determining the fairness and adequacy of a class action
settlement; requiring a "higher standard of fairness" when the settlement is reached before class

certification (citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998))), cert. denied sub
nom. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (mem.); Prof'1 Firefighters Ass'n of Omaha, Local 385 v.
Zalewski, 678 F.3d 640, 648 (8th Cir. 2012) (identifying four factors to be considered in assessing the
fairness of a class action settlement (citing In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d
922, 932 (8th Cir. 2005))); In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 350 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating
that district courts "must make findings as to each of the nine Girsh factors in order to approve a
settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate" and noting the "additional inquiries," identified in

Prudential,"that in many instances will be useful" (discussing Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d
Cir. 1975) and In re Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 323-24 (3d Cir. 1998))).
307. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 8 (statement of Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
See also supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (describing Chief Justice Roberts's reservations about

the cy pres remedy in Marek v. Lane).
308. Federal legislation would avoid any potential Rules Enabling Act challenge to a Federal Rule
that purported to limit attorneys' fees, see, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 36 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Federal Rule 68, as interpreted by the majority to include attorneys' fees as
part of "costs," violated the Rules Enabling Act because it would "'abridge' and . . . 'modify' this
statutory right to reasonable attorney's fees"); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240, 262 (1975) ("[T]he range of discretion of the courts in making [attorneys' fee] awards are
matters for Congress to determine."), although fee awards in "common fund" class actions are not
typically governed by federal statute.

309. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2012) (CAFA provision governing attorneys' fees on coupon
settlements); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2012) (Private Securities Litigation Reform Act provision
governing attorneys' fees in private securities litigation).

310.

See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257 (noting "the historic power of equity to permit... a party

preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of others . .. to recover his costs, including his attorneys'

fees, from the fund or property itself or directly from the other parties enjoying the benefit"). See also,
e.g., Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 507 F. App'x 1, 4 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that the reasonableness
of an award of attorneys' fees is governed by the Goldberger factors, regardless of the method of
calculation employed (citing Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 50 (2d Cir. 2000))), cert.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

Unclaimed or non-distributable funds are a common feature of class
action settlements. The settling parties and courts often prefer cy pres
distributions to reversion and escheat because they are more likely to
achieve the deterrent and compensatory objectives of the law underlying
the class claims. But cy pres distributions are overused today because
defendants prefer them and class counsel do not fight hard enough to
maximize cash payments to class members. Too often the courts acquiesce
in the parties' cy pres proposal.
This Article makes four pragmatic recommendations to minimize cy
pres distributions and to tailor them to better serve the interests of the class.
First, to align the interests of class counsel and the represented class, courts
should presumptively reduce attorneys' fees in cases in which cy pres
distributions are made. Second, to ensure that class members, potential
objectors, and courts have the information they need to assess the fairness
of a settlement that contemplates a cy pres distribution and to enable class
members to make intelligent decisions regarding the right to opt out, class
counsel should be required to make a series of disclosures when it presents
a proposed settlement for judicial approval. Third, to inject an element of
adversarial conflict into the fairness hearing and to further ensure that the
court receives the information needed to scrutinize the proposed cy pres
distribution, the court should appoint a devil's advocate to oppose the
settlement in general, the cy pres distribution in particular, and the request
for attorneys' fees by class counsel. Finally, the court should make written
findings in connection with its review of any class action settlement that
contemplates a cy pres distribution.

denied, 134 S. Ct. 402 (2013); Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 330-31 (3d Cir. 2011)
(identifying the factors to be applied in "determining the appropriate percentage fee award" (citing
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) and In re Prudential, 148
F.3d at 338-40)); Jones v. GN Netcom, Inc. (In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.), 654 F.3d 935,
941-43 (9th Cir. 2011) (identifying the "reasonableness" factors that may be applied to adjust the
lodestar figure (citing Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029)).
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